IRAN
In 1946, the Soviet Union occupied parts of Northern Iran that had previously been attached to the Soviet Union. Truman demanded a Soviet retreat and succeeded in having the Russian troops removed. This overlooked event signified a basis for cooperation with the Soviet Union. The U.S. government ignored the Soviet acquiescence and headed into the Cold War. The next major Iranian event occurred in 1954 when Iranian Prime Minister Mossadegh threatened to nationalize the oil industry. He was forced to resign and the U.S. had its colleague, the anti-Communist and anti-nationalist Shah Pahlevi, firmly in power. The State Department failed to realize that the Shah considered Iran his personal fiefdom and that the uneven economic progress he brought to Iran did not have the support of the masses, especially those inclined to a more rigid Islam. This lack of foresight proved fatal to the Shah and American interests in Iran.

In 1979, the Iranians deposed the Shah and an Islamic movement, led by the Ayatollah Khomeini, gained control. Instead of using diplomacy with the new government and demonstrating restraint, U.S. policy reflected its bias against a regime that did not follow its dictates. Despite Iran's protests, the Carter government, with advice from the ubiquitous Henry Kissinger, allowed the Shah to enter the U.S. for medical treatment. This event provoked extreme groups in Iran to seize the American embassy and hold U.S. citizens as prisoners. The Shah eventually returned to Panama and died in Egypt. Relations with Iran rapidly declined to a total separation. The U.S. quickly lost any economic and strategic advantages it had established in Iran.

U.S. policy planners could not admit mistakes and their policy towards Iran continued on a destructive path. In Iraq's war against Iran, the U.S. provided arms and support to Saddam Hussein. U.S. moved warships into the Straits of Tiran to guard the straits and protect Kuwait against possible Iranian aggression. The only aggression in the Straits was the bombing of a U.S. warship by the Iraqi air force, which at that time was considered a U.S. friend. The Iran/Iraq war, encouraged by U.S. military support to Iraq, caused massive destruction to both countries and to their Kurdish citizens. The hostilities in the Straits of Tiran damaged Iranian shipping and brought death and losses to their flimsy navy. In a coda to the macabre concerto, a U.S. warship shot down an Iranian civilian airliner in Iran territorial waters, and all on board perished. After all these catastrophes, the U.S. has tried to establish friendly relations with Iran. The Iranians are obstinate.

Two recent events have impeded any rapproachment between the United States and Iran. The American occupation of Iraq has strengthened the Shiite majority in that country and made the U.S. suspicious that Iran will influence its co-religionists to favor Iranian policies. U.S. antagonism, pushed by Israel's fear of Iran, has provoked Iran to pursue nuclear weapons. Words lead to more bitter words and not any positive action. Iran's relations with America are as strained as the first day that the U.S. assisted the Shah after his downfall.

IRAQ
U.S. policy towards Iraq has been the reverse of its policy towards Iran. The U.S.caused Iran to become an enemy and later tried to coerce Iran to become a friend. The U.S. supported Iraq in the 1980's, and almost over-night, like Jekyll becoming Hyde, turned itself into an enemy of Iraq. Hussein's 1990 invasion of Kuwait changed America's attitude. Within one month, U.S. led forces in the Persian Gulf war destroyed Iraq. U.S. policy built up an intended friend, determined the intended friend was actually an enemy and then saved the enemy country by destroying it.

Accurate Iraqi casualty figures in the Gulf War, killed and wounded, have been difficult to verify. Estimates range from tens of thousands to 300,000. The PBS program Frontline broadcast its acceptance of the following figures:

According to "Gulf War Air Power Survey" by Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, (a report commissioned by the U.S. Air Force; 1993-ISBN 0-16-041950-6), there were an estimated 10-12,000 Iraqi combat deaths in the air campaign and as many as 10,000 casualties in the ground war. This analysis is based on enemy prisoner of war reports. The Iraqi government says 2,300 civilians died during the air campaign. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontl...dix/death.html

Did all of this have to happen? By being cordial to Saddam Hussein for many years, the United States reinforced the Iraqi leader's power. State department dispatches indicate that Ambassador Glaspie gave Iraq a "green" light to invade Kuwait, or at least did not apply sufficient pressure to prevent the invasion.

Iraq had legitimate complaints: Kuwait had siphoned oil from the shifting sands of Iraqi territory: Kuwait owed a prostate Iraq some remuneration after having defended Kuwait against a possible Iran incursion: Kuwait walked out of discussions on the complaints and totally rebuffed Iraq. The United States could have arbitrated these complaints or forced the parties to comply with its directives. The U.S. policy makers had options. They chose to be complacent and indirectly paved the path to a punishing war.

The post-war policy continued a ferocious pattern and U.S. and British planes bombed Iraq for the next ten years. The bombings destroyed more "command and control" facilities and "radar bases" than Iraq could possibly have had. This senseless and vicious policy transformed Iraq from an emerging country with moderate prosperity into an impoverished country with a starving population. Statistics from a "UN Report on the Current Humanitarian Situation in Iraq, Mar. 1999:"