Why there can't be a 1yr. expiration date in Wa. St.

[jamessr]

you make globs, not points :rastasmoke:

I make points with globs, since we are in nothing but, GLOBS here in wa....have you been following any wa. MMJ cases? They are nothing but, globs of bullshit..:thumbsup:

The "SPECIAL" controlled substance DA in my case even said an authorization is like a drivers license...so who globed who?? lol. A DRIVERS LICENSE?? HUH?

esplain that one if you can, since it has nothing to do with MMJ or an authorization, nor any agency giving out I.D. cards for any lawful cannabis related uses.

I even have more silly claims than that from the SPECIAL DA!!

[jamessr]

This right here is pretty clear that since a 1yr. expiration date is not in any cannabis defense statute the legislature enacted in rcw 69.50 or 69.51A..the courts cannot convict anyone for having an expired authorization.:thumbsup:

For those whom have been wondering what this old outdated court case is about...pay attention.


"Another reason for strict construction is to protect the individual against arbitrary discretion by officials and judges. . . . A related argument is to the effect that since the power to declare what conduct is subject to penal sanctions is legislative rather than judicial, it would risk judicial usurpation of the legislative function for a court to enforce a penalty where the legislature had not clearly and unequivocally prescribed it. In other words, before a person can be punished his case must be plainly and unmistakably within the statute sought to be applied. Thus one court has stated that the reason for the rule was 'to guard against the creation, by judicial construction, of criminal offenses not within the contemplation of the legislature.' It has also been asserted that since the state makes the laws, they should be most strongly construed against it.

[jamessr]

An individuals right to due process, secured by the U.S Const., Amend. 14 â??Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of lawâ?�. and Wa. Const. art. 1 sec. 3 â??No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of lawâ?�., which includes in both, the fundamental notions of fair notice and equal enforcement of the laws. The void for vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness (1972).
A criminal statute must provide fair notice to avoid â??arbitrary, erratic and discriminatory enforcement.â?� City of Seattle v. Douglas, 115 Wn.2d 171, 180 (1990). Applying this principle, courts have not hesitated to invalidate statutes which failed to satisfy due process. See e.g. Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (ordinance making it a crime to congregate in a manner that was â?? annoyingâ?� to others vague); State v. Williams, 144 Wn.2d 197 (2002)(statute criminalizing threats to â??mental healthâ?� of another void for vagueness); Bellevue v. Lorang, 140 Wn.2d 19 (2000 )(telephone threat ordinance, providing defense for caller if purpose was legitimate communication, void for vagueness); State v. Sansone, 127 Wn.App. 630, 639 (2005) (the term â??pornographyâ?�, as used in a community placement order, was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the due process clause).

The due process doctrine seeks to â??ensureâ?� that the public has adequate notice of what conduct is proscribed and to â??ensureâ?� that the public is protected from arbitrary enforcement. State v. Riles, 135 Wn.2d 326, 348, 957 P.2d 655 (1998)
The Fourteenth Amendmentâ??s due process vagueness doctrine has a twofold purpose: (1) to provide the public with adequate notice of what conduct is proscribed and 2) to protect the public from arbitrary or ad-hoc enforcement. City of Bellevue v. Lorang , 140 Wn.2d 19, 30, 992 P.2d 496 (2000) ; State v. Williams, 144 Wn.2d 197, 203, 26 P.3d 890 (2001). A law violates due process vagueness prohibitions if either requirement is satisfied. Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171, 177, 795 P.2d 693 (1990)
A statute fails to provide the required notice if it forbids the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. State v. Watson, 160bWn.2d 1, 7, 154 P.3d 909 (2007); Myrick v. Board of Peirce Cy. Commâ??rs, 102 Wn.2d 698 P.2d 1152 (1984)
â??A vague law impermissibly delegates basic public policy matters to policemen, judges and juries for resolution on an ad-hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.â?� A statute is void if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222(1972).

The supreme court of Washington has consistently held that the fixing of legal punishments for criminal offenses is a legislative function. State v. Pillatos, 159, Wn.2d 459, 150 P.3d 1130 (2007)..
When interpreting a statute, every presumption should favor the act of the legislature and all doubts should be resolved in support of the act. Grant v. Spellman, 99 Wn.2d 815, 819, 664 P.2d 1227 (1983).
Vagueness in a statute raises an issue of procedural due process. The crucial question is whether the statute provides fair notice of the â??conductâ?� prohibited. Blondheim v. State, 84 Wn.2d 874, 878, 529 P.2d 1096 (1975). â?? One to whose conduct a statute â??clearlyâ?� applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756, 41 L.Ed 2d 439, 94 S.Ct. 2547 (1974).

The mere fact that a personâ??s conduct must be subjectively evaluated by a police officer to determine if that person has violated a statute does not make that statute unconstitutionally vague. If this were so, most criminal statutes would be void for vagueness. What is forbidden by the due process clause are criminal statutes that contain â??no standardsâ?� and allow police officers, judges and jury to subjectively decide what conduct the statute proscribes or what conduct will comply with a statute in any given case. State v. Maciolek, 101 Wn.2d 259, 267, 676 P.2d 996 (1984).

To ascertain legislative intent, a court will first look at the plain language of the statute. State v. Reding, 119 Wn.2d 685, 690, 835 P.2d 1019 (1992). State v. Glas, 147 Wn.2d 410, 54 P.3d 147 (2002). The courts primary objective is ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. State v. Radan, 143 Wn.2d 323, 21 P.3d 255 (2001). If a statute is unambiguous it is not subject to judicial interpretation and itâ??s meaning is derived from the statute alone and the court is to assume the legislature meant exactly what it says. State v. Chester, 133 Wn.2d 15, 21, 940 P.2d 1374 (1997), Glas, 147 Wn.2d at 415, Radan, 143 Wn.2d at 330, State v. Keller, 143 Wn.2d 267, 19 P.3d 1030 (2001). Courts may not add language to a clear statute even if the court(s) believe the legislature intended something else but failed to express it adequately. Glas, 147 Wn.2d at 417 citing Chester 133 Wn.2d at 21.
City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171, 182, 795 P.2d 693 (1990) The Challenged statute â??is tested for unconstitutional vagueness by inspecting the actual conduct of the party who challenges the ordinance and not by examining hypothetical situations at the periphery of the ordinanceâ??s scope.â?� Id. At 182-83. Vagueness doctrine requires both a failure to define and failure to prevent arbitrary enforcement, if the challenger proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, the lack of either requirement, the statute is void for vagueness. Id. At 178
Under the definiteness prong, a statute is void for vagueness if persons â??of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. â?? Haley, 117 Wn.2d at 739 (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926). When determining whether the statute provides fair warning of the proscribed conduct, we examine the context of entire enactment, giving the language a â??sensible, meaningful, and practical interpretation.â?� Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 180. But we do not require absolute specificity and agreement. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 179.

Under the arbitrary enforcement prong, the statute is unconstitutional if it â??invites an inordinate amount of police discretion.â?� Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 181. As read in context, we determine whether the statute contains â??inherently subjective terms.â?� Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 181 (quoting State v. Maciolek, 101 Wn.2d 259, 267, [*189] 676 P.2d 996 (1984)). To pass constitutional muster, the statute must provide adequate enforcement standards. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 181.
Bellevue v. Miller, 85 Wn.2d 539, 536 P.2d 603 (1975), the court struck down an ordinance which prohibited wandering and prowling â??in a place, at a time, or in a manner. And under circumstances, which manifest an unlawful purpose.â?� Bellevue, at 542. The ordinance also had a list of circumstances evidencing an unlawful purpose. The problem with the ordinance at issue in Bellevue was the indefiniteness that flowed from the terms â??wanderingâ?� and â??prowlingâ?� and â??unlawfulâ?�. See Maciolek, at 267-68. The main vice of the ordinance was not that the indefiniteness [**1386] failed to give adequate notice of the proscribed conduct, but that it presented too much potential for arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement by placing â??no actual limitationsâ?¦on the exercise of police discretion.â?� Bellevue, [***40] at 545. The ordinance permitted arrest on the mere suspicion that a person has been or is likely to become involved in unlawful activity. Bellevue, at 546.

As such Bellevue v. Miller, supra, stands for the proposition that the primary concern for the vagueness doctrine is â?? lack of effective limits on police discretion.â?� See e.g. Kolender v. Lawson, supra. In Bellevue, we essentially determined that the ordinance had no â??hard coreâ?� because it placed no actual limits on police discretion.(see state v. Fry) It logically follows that an ordinance which fails to give law enforcement sufficient clear notice of the prohibited conduct does not give the general public notice of the conduct it purports to prohibit. See generally Dan-Cohen, Decision rules and conduct rules: On Acoustic Seperation in criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 648-64 (1984)( Analyzing the void-for-vagueness doctrine in terms of a distinction between conduct rules directed toward the population at large and the decision rules directed toward a particular profession and legal audience).

Intent -- 2007 c 371: "The legislature intends to clarify the law on medical marijuana so that the lawful use of this substance is not impaired and medical practitioners are able to exercise their best professional judgment in the delivery of medical treatment, qualifying patients may fully participate in the medical use of marijuana, and designated providers may assist patients in the manner provided by this act without fear of state criminal prosecution. This act is also intended to provide clarification to law enforcement and to all participants in the judicial system." [2007 c 371 § 1.]

RCW 69.51A.060
Crimes â?? Limitations of chapter.



*** CHANGE IN 2010 *** (SEE 5798-S.SL) ***

(1) It shall be a misdemeanor to use or display medical marijuana in a manner or place which is open to the view of the general public.

(2) Nothing in this chapter requires any health insurance provider to be liable for any claim for reimbursement for the medical use of marijuana.

(3) Nothing in this chapter requires any physician to authorize the use of medical marijuana for a patient.

(4) Nothing in this chapter requires any accommodation of any on-site medical use of marijuana in any place of employment, in any school bus or on any school grounds, in any youth center, in any correctional facility, or smoking medical marijuana in any public place as that term is defined in RCW 70.160.020.

(5) It is a class C felony to fraudulently produce any record purporting to be, or tamper with the content of any record for the purpose of having it accepted as, valid documentation under *RCW 69.51A.010(6)(a).

(6) No person shall be entitled to claim the affirmative defense provided in RCW 69.51A.040 for engaging in the medical use of marijuana in a way that endangers the health or well-being of any person through the use of a motorized vehicle on a street, road, or highway.

RCW 69.51A.050
Medical marijuana, lawful possession â?? State not liable.


(1) The lawful possession or manufacture of medical marijuana as authorized by this chapter shall not result in the forfeiture or seizure of any property.

RCW 69.51A.080
Adoption of rules by the department of health â?? Sixty-day supply for qualifying patients.


(1) By July 1, 2008, the department of health shall adopt rules defining the quantity of marijuana that could reasonably be presumed to be a sixty-day supply for qualifying patients; this presumption may be overcome with evidence of a qualifying patient's necessary medical use.

(2) As used in this chapter, "sixty-day supply" means that amount of marijuana that qualifying patients would reasonably be expected to need over a period of sixty days for their personal medical use. During the rule-making process, the department shall make a good faith effort to include all stakeholders identified in the rule-making analysis as being impacted by the rule.


RCW 69.51A.020
Construction of chapter.


Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede Washington state law prohibiting the acquisition, possession, manufacture, sale, or use of marijuana for nonmedical purposes.

[1999 c 2 § 3 (Initiative Measure No. 692, approved November 3, 1998).]

RCW 69.51A.040
Failure to seize marijuana, qualifying patients' affirmative defense.


(1) If a law enforcement officer determines that marijuana is being possessed lawfully under the medical marijuana law, the officer may document the amount of marijuana, take a representative sample that is large enough to test, but not seize the marijuana. A law enforcement officer or agency shall not be held civilly liable for failure to seize marijuana in this circumstance.

(2) If charged with a violation of state law relating to marijuana, any qualifying patient who is engaged in the medical use of marijuana, or any designated provider who assists a qualifying patient in the medical use of marijuana, will be deemed to have established an affirmative defense to such charges by proof of his or her compliance with the requirements provided in this chapter. Any person meeting the requirements appropriate to his or her status under this chapter shall be considered to have engaged in activities permitted by this chapter and shall not be penalized in any manner, or denied any right or privilege, for such actions.

(3) A qualifying patient, if eighteen years of age or older, or a designated provider shall:

(a) Meet all criteria for status as a qualifying patient or designated provider;

(b) Possess no more marijuana than is necessary for the patient's personal, medical use, not exceeding the amount necessary for a sixty-day supply; and

(c) Present his or her valid documentation to any law enforcement official who questions the patient or provider regarding his or her medical use of marijuana.

(4) A qualifying patient, if under eighteen years of age at the time he or she is alleged to have committed the offense, shall demonstrate compliance with subsection (3)(a) and (c) of this section. However, any possession under subsection (3)(b) of this section, as well as any production, acquisition, and decision as to dosage and frequency of use, shall be the responsibility of the parent or legal guardian of the qualifying patient.

[2007 c 371 § 5; 1999 c 2 § 5 (Initiative Measure No. 692, approved November 3, 1998).]

WAC 246-75-010

Medical marijuana.

Medical marijuana.
(1) Purpose. The purpose of this section is to define the amount of marijuana a qualifying patient could reasonably expect to need over a sixty-day period for their personal medical use. It is intended to:

(a) Allow medical practitioners to exercise their best professional judgment in the delivery of medical treatment;

(b) Allow designated providers to assist patients in the manner provided in chapter 69.51A RCW; and

(c) Provide clarification to patients, law enforcement and others in the use of medical marijuana.

(2) Definitions.

(a) "Designated provider" means a person as defined in RCW 69.51A.010.

(b) "Plant" means any marijuana plant in any stage of growth.

(c) "Qualifying patient" means a person as defined in RCW 69.51A.010.

(d) "Useable marijuana" means the dried leaves and flowers of the Cannabis plant family Moraceae. Useable marijuana excludes stems, stalks, seeds and roots.

(3) Presumptive sixty-day supply.

(a) A qualifying patient and a designated provider may possess a total of no more than twenty-four ounces of useable marijuana, and no more than fifteen plants.

(b) Amounts listed in (a) of this subsection are total amounts of marijuana between both a qualifying patient and a designated provider.

(c) The presumption in this section may be overcome with evidence of a qualifying patient's necessary medical use.



[Statutory Authority: RCW 69.51A.080 and 2007 c 371. 08-21-001, § 246-75-010, filed 10/2/08, effective 11/2/08.]

I see nothing which complies with due process here above since the legislature never proscribed any criminal sanctions for an "expired" authorization by time, place nor manner...simply doesn't exist..no place in the entire chapter..and the rest of the chapter applies to practitioner sanctions only which do not transfer to the patient because they are mostly dealing with administrative sanctions against the practitioner. or leo,county discriminatory policy,custom or usage..and "all" involved in the judicial processes.

[jamessr]

5798-S.SL

http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/WSL.../5798-S.SL.pdf

I have had some discussions which have opined this section is the place the "expiration" exists as a 1st amend. "right" of the const. to "limit" the speech to 1 yr. (see conant v. walters)...

(3) Nothing in this chapter requires any physician to authorize the use of medical marijuana for a patient.


The statutes operative language seems to disagree..

[jamessr]

YET, the judge in my specific case disagreed with the state and agreed with me, NOTHING MENTIONED IN THE WHOLE CHAPTER ABOUT 1 YR. EXPIRATION MANDATED DATES INVALIDATES AN AUTHORIZATION ALREADY SIGNED(DATE OR NOT EXPIRING IT.)and went into statutory construction and opined(without facts & conclusions) that since I had 2 authorizations for differant conditions for the same drug, my 2004 was superseded by the "limited" 1 yr. authorization by reason of it being for the same drug "only"...then opined that the court doesn't understand if a dr. is able to authorize a specific treatment why the same dr. can't limit, change the course or eliminate said treatment to be in compliance with the statue's intent...the professional opinion of the dr..

Well, he is correct in the sense of across the board without a case by case examination of the facts to the laws..

For example, if your treatment of using mmj worsens your condition, then well, he is on point...

But, if your condition relies on your use to live or be without chronic pain, say like with any condition in section (a)...then he is completely wrong, cause that would cause harm and put the dr. at jeopardy for being outside the standards of care... some conditions require a dr. to mitigate the symptoms with because there is nothing else available to them because of the "COMPLEXITY" of the condition(s)...and can't be changed due to life or slow death which is cruel and unusual...

Oh, I forgot..my dr. wasn't the one who claimed I was guilty, nor did the state claim I provided fraudulent documents..or altered..as a matter of fact..I asked those specific questions...because that's what the legislature proscribed as to my conduct...

[justpics]

:beatdeadhorse: ok its dead

[jamessr]

:beatdeadhorse: ok its dead

O.K. so I think we need an appellate judges rulings, or a supreme ct. ruling...to be "truly" beaten dead in all due respects...isn't this what you told me just at the beginning of the yr ??...but, for expost-facto and quo warranto??:wtf:

This is the correct ave...isn't it?? or is it all 3 or none of them?? :stoned:

It ain't a dead hoarse beaten till we cap it the right way..lol.

Just like the gulf oil leak/spill...ain't done till it's capped off right and no-more comes out.

[Satica]

I think the disconnect here may be considering some clinics to be "doc-in-the-box's".
The law isn't written to only allow health care professionals with or at private practices. The way it's written explains that the health care professional licensed under the appropriate chapters have the right and authority to recommend medical marijuana.
Now, on the renewal/expiration issue. Some clinics are a little dishonest, or they don't quite give all of the information. There's actually nothing written in the laws stating that the recommendation ever expires. HOWEVER, if a recommendation is written with an expiration date, it can be interpreted that the Dr is terminating the recommendation on that date, depending on the judge, jury etc. How does the judge know that you're "scheduled to be better" by that date?
The renewal at our clinic covers all of the benefits included with a membership, and is only $100. We also offer programs with yearly renewals and three year renewals. This means that your membership is valid with us until the expiration date passes. This means that we will go to bat for you in the unfortunate event something should happen all the way until your membership expires.
Now of course we don't want your membership to expire, because we want to be able to defend you as much as possible. But, if you can't keep up with your membership costs, and aren't eligible for our scholarship program, you'll have to defend your expired authorization. And again that's possible, but it boils down to the judge and jury you get. But it does appear precedence has been set already anyways, so a lapsed recommendation may be dependable. But, that's a risky venture right there if you ask me.

[jamessr]

I think the disconnect here may be considering some clinics to be "doc-in-the-box's".
The law isn't written to only allow health care professionals with or at private practices. The way it's written explains that the health care professional licensed under the appropriate chapters have the right and authority to recommend medical marijuana.
Now, on the renewal/expiration issue. Some clinics are a little dishonest, or they don't quite give all of the information. There's actually nothing written in the laws stating that the recommendation ever expires. HOWEVER, if a recommendation is written with an expiration date, it can be interpreted that the Dr is terminating the recommendation on that date, depending on the judge, jury etc. How does the judge know that you're "scheduled to be better" by that date?
The renewal at our clinic covers all of the benefits included with a membership, and is only $100. We also offer programs with yearly renewals and three year renewals. This means that your membership is valid with us until the expiration date passes. This means that we will go to bat for you in the unfortunate event something should happen all the way until your membership expires.
Now of course we don't want your membership to expire, because we want to be able to defend you as much as possible. But, if you can't keep up with your membership costs, and aren't eligible for our scholarship program, you'll have to defend your expired authorization. And again that's possible, but it boils down to the judge and jury you get. But it does appear precedence has been set already anyways, so a lapsed recommendation may be dependable. But, that's a risky venture right there if you ask me.

Actually, the clinics have no expertise in the practice of medicine..i.e. the registered shareholder/owner(s) of the fictitious name...you can't say or do squat for anyone....and 3yr recommendations clearly shows you have commercialized the patient-practitioner relationship...which is against public policy... so you actually have already seriously misinformed people from the start, care to try again?

[justpics]

:beatdeadhorse: