Justpics, here is the case in which the medical necessity defense was extiguished by the court under State v. Butler.

The law is well settled that if a statute is inconsistent with the common law, we deem the statute to abrogate the common law. State v. Pub. Util. Dist. No.1 of Douglas County, 83 Wn.2d 219, 517 P.2d 585 (1973); Harmon v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 83 Wn. App. 596, 922 P.2d 201 (1996). Such is the case here. We hold, therefore, that the Medical Use of Marijuana Act affirmative defense superseded the common law medical necessity defense.

So as you see, the courts will not allow a medical necessity defense under the wac code as written...it goes to the jury to decide, not the judge.

All amounts are to be decided by a jury period.

Now here is why it is a statutory defense and not an Aff. Def. under rcw 69.50.308(e). Burden shifting is the key here....and Mcbride fails here...

Due process requires that the State prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable [***7] doubt; if a defense negates an element of the charged [**220] crime, the State has the constitutional burden to prove the absence of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 10-11, 921 P.2d 1035 (1996).

WA[5][5] The public premises defense applies when the defendant has "complied with all lawful conditions imposed on access[.]" RCW 9A.52.090(2). If a person so complies, that person is "privileged to . . . enter" and there is no "unlawful" entry. See RCW 9A.52.080(1); RCW 9A.52.010(3). The defense therefore negates an element of the crime, and cannot be deemed an affirmative defense because to do so would relieve the State of its burden of proof. See, e.g., Lively, 130 Wn.2d at 10-11.