Why there can't be a 1yr. expiration date in Wa. St.

The State of Washington, Appellant, v. Larry H. Enloe, Respondent

No. 7468-4-III

COURT OF APPEALS OF WASHINGTON, Division Three, Panel Four

47 Wn. App. 165; 734 P.2d 520; 1987 Wash. App. LEXIS 3342


March 12, 1987


CASE SUMMARY

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The State appealed a judgment of the Superior Court for Grant County (Washington) that dismissed on constitutional grounds an information filed against defendant, charging him with failure to pay for agricultural products under Wash. Rev. Code § 20.01.460(2)(d).

OVERVIEW: Defendant had claimed that the information failed to state a crime, or in the alternative, that the crime stated was contrary to Wash. Const. art. 1, § 17 because § 20.01.460(2)(d) provided a criminal sanction for a civil debt. Section 20.01.460(2)(d) stated that a person who intentionally failed to pay for agricultural products valued at more than $ 250 would be guilty of a class C felony. The trial court found that § 20.01.460(2)(d) was unconstitutional on its face and dismissed the charges against defendant. In affirming the judgment, the court concluded that § 20.01.460(2)(d) violated the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. Specifically, the court held that § 20.01.460(2)(d) could not be construed to require a showing of fraudulent intent as an element of the crime defined in the statute because the word "intentional" could not be construed according to its plain meaning to mean "fraudulent intent." Under modern procedural due process rights, such judicial construction was precluded. The court stated that to attempt such a construction would be to read into the statute an element, which was not there.

OUTCOME: The court affirmed the trial court judgment.


CORE TERMS: imprisonment, agricultural products, strictly construed, fraudulent intent, fraudulent, failure to pay, penal statutes, constitutional prohibition, criminal statute, commission merchant, intentionally, nonpayment, constitutional provision, intent to defraud, criminal offense, judicial construction, punished, dealer, buyer, canon, criminal sanction, criminal penalty, personal liberty, fail to pay, manner required, inspection fee, plain meaning, accepted meaning, predecessor, imprisoned


Constitutional Law > State Constitutional Operation
See Wash. Const. art. 1, § 17.


Constitutional Law > State Constitutional Operation
Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses > Miscellaneous Offenses > General Overview
In order for Wash. Rev. Code § 20.01.460(2)(d) to avoid the constitutional prohibitions against imprisonment for debt, fraudulent intent must be made an element of the crime. Failure to pay a debt, although intentional in the sense that a decision is made to use funds available for purposes other than payment of the debt, cannot be criminally punished because of the prohibition in Wash. Const. art. 1, § 17.


Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
A statute is presumed constitutional, and if the legislative enactment is reasonably capable of a constitutional construction, it must be given that construction. However, the drafting of a statute is a legislative, not a judicial, function. Therefore, courts will not read into a statute matters which are not there, nor modify a statute by construction. Further, courts may not read into a statute things which it conceives the legislature has left out unintentionally.


Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
Governments > Legislation > Types of Statutes
The role of the judiciary in construction of a criminal statute is especially circumscribed. Criminal statutes involving a deprivation of liberty must be strictly construed against the against the State.


Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
Governments > Legislation > Types of Statutes
Statutes which define crimes must be strictly construed according to the plain meaning of their words to assure that citizens have adequate notice of the terms of the law, as required by due process. Men of common intelligence cannot be required to guess at the meaning of the enactment.


Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
Governments > Legislation > Types of Statutes
Penal statutes must be strictly construed in determining the liability of the person upon whom the penalty is imposed, and that the more severe the penalty, and the more disastrous the consequence to the person subjected to the provisions of the statute, the more rigid will be the construction of its provisions in favor of such person and against the enforcement of such law.


Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
The ordinary meaning of "intentional" cannot be construed according to its plain meaning to mean "fraudulent intent." "Intentional" is defined as "done by intention or design." Fraudulent, on the other hand, is defined as "belonging to or characterized by fraud," and fraud is defined as "intentional misrepresentation, concealment or nondisclosure to cause a person to part with some valuable thing belonging to him."


Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses > Miscellaneous Offenses > General Overview
Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
Wash. Rev. Stat. § 20.01.460(2)(d) cannot be construed to require a showing of fraudulent intent as an element of the crime defined in the statute. To attempt such a construction would be to read into the statute an element which is not there.



SUMMARY: [***1] Nature of Action: Prosecution for failure to pay for agricultural products.

Superior Court: The Superior Court for Grant County, No. 85-1-00041-5, Clinton J. Merritt, J., dismissed the charge on November 12, 1985.

Court of Appeals: Holding that the statutory basis for the charge was unconstitutional, the court affirms the judgment


WA[1][1] Constitutional Law â?? Imprisonment for Debt â?? Prohibition â?? In General Under Const. art. 1, § 17, which prohibits imprisonment for debt, intent to defraud must be an element of any crime based upon nonpayment of a financial obligation. The element of intentional nonpayment is insufficient to escape the constitutional prohibition.

WA[2][2] Criminal Law â?? Statutes â?? Construction â?? Rule of Lenity â?? In General A statute involving loss of personal liberty will be strictly construed against the State. The courts will not read terms into a statute in order to render the statute constitutional.

WA[3][3] Agriculture â?? Failure To Pay for Agricultural Product â?? Statutory Provisions â?? Validity Former RCW 20.01.460(2)(d) (Laws of 1982, ch. 20, § 4), which makes it a crime to intentionally fail to pay for agricultural products, violates the prohibition of Const. art. 1, § 17 against imprisonment for debt.

COUNSEL: Paul Klasen, Prosecuting Attorney, and Stephen J. Hallstrom and Mary Ann Brady, Deputies, for appellant.

Chelsea C. Korte and Cone, Fraser, Gilreath & Korte, for respondent.

JUDGES: McInturff, C.J. Green and Thompson, JJ., concur.

OPINION BY: McINTURFF

OPINION

[*166] [**521] The State appeals the Superior Court's dismissal on constitutional grounds of the information filed against Larry H. Enloe, charging him with failure to pay for agricultural products under RCW 20.01.460(2)(d). We affirm, finding the statute violates the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt, and therefore is unconstitutional on its face.

Mr. Enloe was charged with a violation of RCW 20.01.460(2)(d), failure to pay for agricultural products. The information stated the violation was committed when Mr. Enloe

intentionally [***2] fail[ed] to pay Earl Monroe for agricultural products purchased on or about the 26th and 28th days of June, 1984 and the 1st day of July, 1984, valued at more than two hundred fifty dollars, within the time and manner required by Title 20, RCW;

(Penalty: 5 years/10,000).

No facts on the particularities of the transaction are contained in the record.

Mr. Enloe moved to dismiss, claiming the information failed to state a crime, or in the alternative, that the crime stated was contrary to Const. art. 1, § 17 because the statute provided a criminal sanction for a civil debt. The Superior Court found the statute was unconstitutional on its face and dismissed the charges against Mr. Enloe.

The only issue is whether RCW 20.01.460(2)(d), which provides for criminal sanctions, is unconstitutional under Const. art. 1, § 17, which prohibits imprisonment for debt. Mr. Enloe urges that the statute is unconstitutional on its [*167] face because it does not require an intent to defraud, i.e., a criminal intent; instead, the statute only requires proof defendant intentionally failed to pay within the stated period of time.

[**522] RCW 20.01 is entitled "Agricultural [***3] Products -- Commission Merchants, Dealers, Brokers, Buyers, Agents". It provides for regulation, including licensing and inspection, of transactions in agricultural products. Former RCW 20.01.460(2)(d) provides:

Any commission merchant, dealer, or cash buyer, or any person assuming or attempting to act as a commission merchant, dealer, or cash buyer without a license is guilty of a class C felony who:

. . .

(d) Intentionally fails to pay for agricultural products valued at more than two hundred fifty dollars within the time and in the manner required by this chapter . . .

The disputed language in (d) was added in 1982. Laws of 1982, ch. 20, § 4, p. 129.

Const. art. 1, § 17 provides: "There shall be no imprisonment for debt, except in cases of absconding debtors."

The State argues this case is controlled by Northern Cedar Co. v. French, 131 Wash. 394, 408, 230 P. 837 (1924), modified on other grounds, 133 Wash. 692, 233 P. 39, appeal dismissed, 270 U.S. 625, 70 L. Ed. 767, 46 S. Ct. 204 (1925). Northern Cedar Co., at 399, construed the predecessor to RCW 20.01.460(2)(d) and stated at pages 408-09:



[***4]

The act provides that any person "violating any provisions of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." It is argued by respondent that this is in violation of our constitutional provision against imprisonment for debt, because elsewhere it is provided that the commission merchant must, within a designated time, make remittance to the producer. We agree with the trial court that there is no merit in this point.

In Clark v. State, 171 Ind. 104, 84 N. E. 984 [(1908)] the court said:

"But it is plain that this constitutional inhibition was directed against imprisonment for debt in civil actions at the instance of the creditor, with a view to coercing payment [*168] of his debt, and had no reference to such actions as might be brought by the state through its officers in the interest of good morals and honest dealing."

The purpose of the act is not to punish for failure to comply with the obligation to pay money, but the fraudulent intention with which the money is withheld. Lamar v. State, 120 Ga. 312, 47 S. E. 958 [1904]; Freeman v. United States, 217 U.S. 539, [54 L. Ed. 874, 30 S. Ct. 592 (1910)].

(Italics [***5] ours.)

Northern Cedar holds that fraudulent intent to withhold money is constitutionally required before one can be found guilty of a violation of the predecessor statute to RCW 20.01.460(2)(d). The failure to prove such intent renders the statute violative of the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for a debt. The court held the statute constitutional by ruling that fraudulent intent was an added element of proof under the statute. Northern Cedar, at 409.

In State v. McFarland, 60 Wash. 98, 105, 110 P. 792 (1910), a statute which provided for imprisonment for mere failure by a hotel keeper to pay an inspection fee was found unconstitutional because it provided for imprisonment for debt:

The only alleged criminal offense, with the commission of which the appellant has been charged, is that he did not pay the inspection fee. He cannot be fined nor imprisoned for any such act, as it cannot be made a criminal offense.

The court struck down the unconstitutional provision of the statute, rather than reading "fraudulent intent" into the statute as was done in Northern Cedar to make the criminal penalty constitutional. McFarland [***6] , at 105.

In State v. Williams, 133 Wash. 121, 122, 233 P. 285 (1925), the court held the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt did not apply to a contractor who receives the full price for a contract, but does not pay laborers and materialmen. The court found the contractors were not being punished for any debt which they may owe [*169] their contractee by reasons of the receipt of the contract price, but for their fraud -- [**523] for secreting or failure to pay as they should "with intent to deprive or defraud the owner thereof". State v. Williams, supra at 123.

There are few cases interpreting Const. art. 1, § 17. In State v. Barklind, 87 Wn.2d 814, 819, 557 P.2d 314 (1976), the court stated: "It is elementary that personal liberty transcends the obligation to pay a monetary sum in most circumstances." The Barklind court cited In re Milecke, 52 Wash. 312, 315, 100 P. 743 (1909), which stated:

Imprisonment for debt is abhorrent to the spirit of free government, and is not to be tolerated under the form of penal statutes. That no man shall oppress his debtor or restrain [***7] him of his liberty has come to be a fixed principle, cherished by the people, and so guarded by constitutional provisions that the legislature cannot give ear to those who seek to use the power of the state to coerce the payment of their debts.

The court upheld a statute providing for criminal penalties for failure to pay a hotel bill by construing the statute to require fraudulent incurrence of the debt, not simple nonpayment:

It would be beyond our province to hold that a person could be imprisoned for a simple contract debt; . . . The law under consideration goes no further than to say that the fraudulent incurring of a debt is a crime. Appellant has obtained a thing of value with intent to defraud. He is liable, as much so as is the one who by fraudulent pretense obtains the goods of a merchant or the money of a banker.

Milecke, at 315.

WA[1][1] We hold that in order for RCW 20.01.460(2)(d) to avoid the constitutional prohibitions against imprisonment for debt, fraudulent intent must be made an element of the crime. Failure to pay a debt, although intentional in the sense that a decision is made to use funds available for purposes other than payment of [***8] the debt, cannot be criminally punished because of the prohibition in Const. art. 1, § 17. The wording of RCW 20.01.460(2)(d), absent construing [*170] the statute to require a showing of fraudulent intent, would permit imprisonment for such nonpayment of debt.

WA[2][2] A statute is presumed constitutional, State v. Maciolek, 101 Wn.2d 259, 263, 676 P.2d 996 (1984), and if the legislative enactment is reasonably capable of a constitutional construction, it must be given that construction. Seattle v. Drew, 70 Wn.2d 405, 408, 423 P.2d 522, 25 A.L.R.3d 827 (1967). However, the drafting of a statute is a legislative, not a judicial, function. State v. Martell, 22 Wn. App. 415, 418, 591 P.2d 789 (1979). Therefore, courts will not read into a statute matters which are not there, nor modify a statute by construction. Rhoad v. McLean Trucking Co., 102 Wn.2d 422, 426, 686 P.2d 483 (1984); State v. Martell, supra at 418. Further, courts may not read into a statute things which it conceives the Legislature has left out unintentionally. Rhoad, at 427.

The role of the judiciary in construction of a [***9] criminal statute is especially circumscribed. Criminal statutes involving a deprivation of liberty must be strictly construed against the State. 1 In re Carson, 84 Wn.2d 969, 973, [**524]
530 [*171] P.2d 331 (1975). In State v. Shipp, 93 Wn.2d 510, 610 P.2d 1322 (1980), the task of the court was to interpret the term "knowledge" in a criminal statute. The court, at pages 515-16, found it would be a violation of procedural due process to interpret "knowledge" to mean "negligent ignorance", stating:

Statutes which define crimes must be strictly construed according to the plain meaning of their words to assure that citizens have adequate notice of the terms of the law, as required by due process. "Men of common intelligence cannot be required to guess at the meaning of the enactment." Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515, 92 L. Ed. 840, 68 S. Ct. 665 (1947); Seattle v. Pullman, 82 Wn.2d 794, 797, 514 P.2d 1059 (1973). The word "knowledge" has an ordinary and accepted meaning. A statutory redefinition of knowledge to mean negligent ignorance would completely contradict the accepted meaning. [***10]

(Italics ours.)


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1 As stated in 3 N. Singer, Statutory Construction § 59.03, at 12-13 (1986):

"'It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that penal statutes must be strictly construed in determining the liability of the person upon whom the penalty is imposed, and that the more severe the penalty, and the more disastrous the consequence to the person subjected to the provisions of the statute, the more rigid will be the construction of its provisions in favor of such person and against the enforcement of such law.' . . . Several reasons are advanced in justification of the rule that penal statutes should be strictly construed. These are based on a concern for the rights and freedoms of accused individuals. Strict construction is a means of assuring fairness to persons subject to the law by requiring penal statutes to give clear and unequivocal warning in language that people generally would understand, concerning actions [that] would expose them to liability for penalties and what the penalties would be. A number of courts have said: '. . . the rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed . . . is a fundamental principle which in our judgment will never be altered. Why? Because the lawmaking body owes the duty to citizens and subjects of making unmistakably clear those acts for the commission of which the citizen may lose his life or liberty. Therefore, all the canons of interpretation which apply to civil statutes apply to criminal statutes, and in addition there exists the canon [of strict construction]. . . . The burden lies on the lawmakers, and inasmuch as it is within their power, it is their duty to relieve the situation of all doubts.' . . .

"Another reason for strict construction is to protect the individual against arbitrary discretion by officials and judges. . . . A related argument is to the effect that since the power to declare what conduct is subject to penal sanctions is legislative rather than judicial, it would risk judicial usurpation of the legislative function for a court to enforce a penalty where the legislature had not clearly and unequivocally prescribed it. In other words, before a person can be punished his case must be plainly and unmistakably within the statute sought to be applied. Thus one court has stated that the reason for the rule was 'to guard against the creation, by judicial construction, of criminal offenses not within the contemplation of the legislature.' It has also been asserted that since the state makes the laws, they should be most strongly construed against it.

"The canon of interpretation has also been accorded the status of a constitutional rule under principles of due process, not subject to abrogation by statute." (Italics ours.)

- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

[***11] WA[3][3] the ordinary meaning of "intentional" cannot be construed according to its plain meaning to mean "fraudulent intent". "Intentional" is defined as "done by intention or design". Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1176 (1969). Fraudulent, on the other hand, is defined as "belonging to or characterized by fraud", Webster's, at 904, and fraud is defined as "intentional misrepresentation, concealment or nondisclosure [to cause a person] to part with some valuable thing belonging to him". [*172] Webster's, at 904.

RCW 20.01.460(2)(d) cannot be construed to require a showing of fraudulent intent as an element of the crime defined in this statute. To attempt such a construction would be to read into the statute an element which is not there. State v. Martell, supra.

We conclude Milecke and Northern Cedar and cases decided upon a similar basis would be decided differently today. That saving judicial construction was a modification of the statute, which today is more properly left to the Legislature. More importantly, modern procedural due process rights, recognized with regard to proscription of activity by criminal [***12] statutes, preclude judicial construction in this instance. Therefore, on its face, RCW 20.01.460(2)(d) violates the prohibition in Const. art. 1, § 17 against imprisonment for debt.

The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed; the information against Mr. Enloe is dismissed with prejudice.:thumbsup::cool::pimp:

I guess the simple answer is the court cannot invalidate an authorization or read into the statute that which hasn't been written by the legislators or the people. The doc in the box cannot legally put an expiration date on an authorization unless the doctor specifies the reason for it in the medical records, and the doc in the box nor the courts can invalidate an authorization because a yearly fee wasn't paid. So, give us more in layman's terms. :jointsmile:

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Originally Posted by gypski

I guess the simple answer is the court cannot invalidate an authorization or read into the statute that which hasn't been written by the legislators or the people. The doc in the box cannot legally put an expiration date on an authorization unless the doctor specifies the reason for it in the medical records, and the doc in the box nor the courts can invalidate an authorization because a yearly fee wasn't paid. So, give us more in layman's terms. :jointsmile:

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Laymens terms. DOC-IN-THE-BOXES have no legal authority under wa. st. laws to conduct any lawful services under "ANY" medical health laws in wa....

When there is no law what so ever allowing there existence. We the patients are being defrauded. Not only that but, when the clinic puts a 1 yr. expiration date on ur authorization..this is the business administrative rights which doc-in-the-boxes have none...

As one can plainly see by this case above, criminally charging one for not paying the yearly "FEE" (WHICH BY THE WAY IS NOT IN ANY STATUTE) is a violation of the const. IF CHARGED WITH A CRIME BECAUSE YOU DIDN'T PAY-TO-PLAY.

I.E. NO-ONE CAN BE IMPRISONED FOR A DEBT. CAUSE IT IS NOT A PUBLIC CRIMINAL OFFENSE.

So, bottom line, because a patient doesn't pay a yearly fee, that non payment does not and cannot invalidate their doctor's signed authorization. Or is the authorization invalidated because under the law, doc in the boxes aren't legal?

Or, because it was signed by a doctor licensed to practice medicine, regardless of how a patient gets to them, the authorization is valid, then doctor cannot be charged for dishonest services because his corporate entity was the original violator of the law? Ignorance of the law is no excuse, but I cannot see how a court could reasonably invalidate an authorization under these parameters since an initial fee was paid believing it was valid with no expiration date in compliance with RCW 69.51a and signed by a licensed doctor. :wtf:

Many inquiring minds need to know? I-1068 would undo all these legal gymnastics. :D

I would just make sure you see that docotr at least once per year to ensure you have a doctor patient relationship the courts will recognize.

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Originally Posted by justpics

I would just make sure you see that docotr at least once per year to ensure you have a doctor patient relationship the courts will recognize.

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That could also be up for question if a person has no insurance, can't pay the $200 fee, and they can prove that their condition still exists. And, I don't see anyone offering to sign for free without expiration dates for indigent patients. King County only requires medical records to support one's medical use that are proof. So, what is the state standard, not the county standard which only applies in King County in this respect. :rastasmoke:

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Originally Posted by justpics

I would just make sure you see that docotr at least once per year to ensure you have a doctor patient relationship the courts will recognize.

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A lot of patients are on the Washington State Community Health plan, and as far as I can tell or am aware, they don't allow discussions of medical marijuana or their doctors signing for patients or try finding one that does. Nor will they pay for the visit if its for mmj. Another run down the gauntlet for patients. :wtf:

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Originally Posted by gypski

A lot of patients are on the Washington State Community Health plan, and as far as I can tell or am aware, they don't allow discussions of medical marijuana or their doctors signing for patients or try finding one that does. Nor will they pay for the visit if its for mmj. Another run down the gauntlet for patients. :wtf:

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So my friend, are you saying that my authorization from my m.d. which the state paid for is invalid because the DSHS paid for it? Hell, I discussed medical marijuana with my m.d. for more than 4 hrs in 3 visits...THIS IS NOT A DOC-IN-THE-BOX M.D. EITHER..but, my personal specialized practicing m.d. in the art of immunology and it's egregious effects on the body, which "REQUIRES" anti-inflammatory properties and the ECS to operate in a reasonable fashion...which the FDA has no listed or upcoming pharmies for...cannabis offers the "ONLY" relief available.

One day I will show you the ropes my friend...it is very easy once you understand the ways of the jedi.lol. Ya just have to understand the system and how it works to ur benefit..

Quote:

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Originally Posted by gypski

That could also be up for question if a person has no insurance, can't pay the $200 fee, and they can prove that their condition still exists. And, I don't see anyone offering to sign for free without expiration dates for indigent patients. King County only requires medical records to support one's medical use that are proof. So, what is the state standard, not the county standard which only applies in King County in this respect. :rastasmoke:

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actually those are no longer valid, unless they predate June 10th 2010, as they would not be on tamper resistant paper recognized by the BOP.

Even one that was from before June 10th would barely be worth the paper it was printed on, because police will haul your ass in more often than not and let the courts figure it out.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by gypski

So, bottom line, because a patient doesn't pay a yearly fee, that non payment does not and cannot invalidate their doctor's signed authorization. Or is the authorization invalidated because under the law, doc in the boxes aren't legal?

Or, because it was signed by a doctor licensed to practice medicine, regardless of how a patient gets to them, the authorization is valid, then doctor cannot be charged for dishonest services because his corporate entity was the original violator of the law? Ignorance of the law is no excuse, but I cannot see how a court could reasonably invalidate an authorization under these parameters since an initial fee was paid believing it was valid with no expiration date in compliance with RCW 69.51a and signed by a licensed doctor. :wtf:

Many inquiring minds need to know? I-1068 would undo all these legal gymnastics. :D

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READ PEOPLE V. WINDUS IN THE LEGAL SECTION HERE!!! SAME LEGAL THEORY APPLIES HERE IN WA. ST.

ALSO IF YOU GOT UR AUTHORIZATION FROM A DOC-IN-THE-BOX, YOU DIDN'T SEE A M.D. FOR UR AUTHORIZATION...YOU FIRST HAD TO SEE A LAYMEN BUSINESS OWNER(THEIR ADMIN. PROCESS, I.E. PAY-TO-PLAY) BEFORE YOU COULD GET TO SEE ANY DR....

Also read the the statutes about "LEARNED PROFESSIONS" and "WHO" may practice any healthcare in wa...ONLY LICENSED PROFESSIONALS MAY START OR OWN(SHAREHOLDER) ANY HEALTHCARE BUSINESS...NOT LAYPERSONS!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

You have an authorization from a clinic which can't sell anyone any health services at all in wa....

We will work on this issue my friend but, you must understand the rules of engagement first.!!! THE LEGAL ONES...LOL.

p.s.,MY LONG TIME FRIEND "SHOTWELL" IS RUNNING FOR SHERIFF IN OUR COUNTY..got to love it...he almost won last time...hee hee hee.

Many inquiring minds need to know? I-1068 would undo all these legal gymnastics.

The legal answer to this is "YES" for state "ONLY"!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

IT REMOVES ALL CANNABIS RELATED ISSUES AS A "PUBLIC OFFENSE"..I.E. NONE CRIMINAL AND AS TOMATOES ARE...FREE TO PROPAGATE WITHOUT STATE INTERFERENCE(NOT FEDERAL, READ MONSON V. U.S. IN THE LEGAL SECTION, CANNABIS L. SATIVA IS ALSO HEMP)...BUT, WILL STILL DRAW IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, READ ATTORNEY GENERAL HOLDERS INTERNAL MEMO/POLICY..VERY CLEAR IT "ONLY" APPLIES TO MEDICAL MARIJUANA UNDER STATE STATUTE, NOT COMPLETE LEGALIZATION...WHICH IS CONTRARY TO FEDERAL PUBLIC POLICY...

THIS IS FOR ADULTS ONLY AND DOESN'T PROTECT YOU AGAINST DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ANY "DRUGS"...our laws clearly state "drugs" and not specific to any "drugs" in a persons body..this in of itself will be gymnastics with the recent ruling about delta 9 and our body producing delta 11..just saying.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by justpics

actually those are no longer valid, unless they predate June 10th 2010, as they would not be on tamper resistant paper recognized by the BOP.

Even one that was from before June 10th would barely be worth the paper it was printed on, because police will haul your ass in more often than not and let the courts figure it out.

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The bop isn't involved in any policy making or enforcement here...read how the bop refused to be a part of this decision making process....why? BECAUSE THE MQAC IS THE "ONLY" LEGISLATED AGENCY OVERSIGHT FOR MEDICAL MARIJUANA..AND NO-ONE WHO HAS A DEA LICENSE CAN PRESCRIBE CANNABIS THERAPY..THEY CAN "ONLY" RECOMMEND IT..see conant v. walters.

furthermore, any authorizations prior to this enactment, are "GRANDFATHERED IN"...STEVE SARICH IS COMPLETELY WRONG HERE ABOUT VALIDITY( he is correct about some asshat not knowing the laws and arbitrarily arresting you)...."ONLY" PERTINENT MEDICAL RECORDS ARE NOT ALLOWED ANYMORE IN ANY COURT CASES...WHICH WAS NOT GRANDFATHERED IN, BECAUSE IT IS A VIOLATION OF PRIVACY IN ONE'S MEDICAL RECORDS AND PHYSICIAN/PATIENT RELATIONSHIP.. A CLEAR VIOLATION OF LAW..geez!!

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Originally Posted by justpics

I would just make sure you see that docotr at least once per year to ensure you have a doctor patient relationship the courts will recognize.

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This is completely "LEGALLY" incorrect SINCE THE DOC-IN-THE-BOXES ARE IME CLINICS... THEY REQUIRE YOU BRING IN MEDICAL RECORDS FROM ANOTHER HEALTHCARE PRACTITIONER WHICH STATES YOU HAVE A QUALIFYING CONDITION IN THEIR DIAGNOSIS...READ PEOPLE V. WINDUS FROM CALI IN THE LEGAL SECTION...TIS THE SAME LEGAL THEORY HERE IN WA....ONCE YOU HAVE THE SAME CONDITION AND IT IS ONGOING(I.E. DEBILITATING OR TERMINAL) NO-ONE YR APPLIES WHICH IS NOT IN THE ACT...

PLEASE QUOTE THE SECTION IN THE MUMA/CUA ACT WHICH SAYS A 1 YR IS MANDATED UNDER LAW....OR EVEN CLOSE TO SAYING SUCH A THING...

1000 BUCKS SAYS YOU CAN'T...I HAVE A JUDGES LEGAL OPINION IN MY CASE WHICH SPECIFICALLY STATES THERE IS NO 1 YR "REQUIREMENT" IN THE "CHAPTER" TO BE FOUND....

" THEY ARE MERELY SILENT. THERE IS NO LANGUAGE REGARDING THESE ISSUES TO BE FOUND, ONE WAY OR THE OTHER, IN THE ENTIRE CHAPTER. PUT ANOTHER WAY, THERE IS NO "WORDING" TO CONSTRUE; INSTEAD THERE IS A LACK OF IT"

IME IS A VERY LIMITED WAY TO SHOW ANY RELATIONSHIP WITH ANY HEALTHCARE PRACTIONER..DOC-IN-THE-BOXES DON'T QUALIFY BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT RECOGNIZED UNDER ANY WA. ST. LEARNED PROFESSIONS PUBLIC POLICY..

the doctor who writes your authorization is making the diagnoses based on your previous medical records.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by justpics

the doctor who writes your authorization is making the diagnoses based on your previous medical records.

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Can you explain this in step-by-step fashion in "DETAIL" please...you are confusing me john..lol. Start with the law which allows this to occur first, please john. THEN GO FROM THERE.

I really don't get why you keep calling me john...


anyway;

" (a) Is a patient of a physician licensed under chapter 18.71 or 18.57 RCW;

(b) Has been diagnosed by THAT physician as having a terminal or debilitating medical condition;"


that's the basis in law for what I am saying, its RCW69.51A.010 (a), (b)

Quote:

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Originally Posted by justpics

I really don't get why you keep calling me john...


anyway;

" (a) Is a patient of a physician licensed under chapter 18.71 or 18.57 RCW;

(b) Has been diagnosed by THAT physician as having a terminal or debilitating medical condition;"


that's the basis in law for what I am saying, its RCW69.51A.010 (a), (b)

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Sorry about the john...is just my way of saying shitty..my bad.

You are focusing on just one small area of law, which don't even apply to a doc-in-the-box when fettered out...

YOU ARE A PATIENT OF THE CLINIC, NOT THE health care practitioner, regardless of who signed....this is obviously were your analysis goes out the window. The physician who made the diagnosis is not the doc-in-the-box doctor but, the diagnosing physician in your prior medical records they look at...i.e. PERTINENT MEDICAL RECORDS WHICH SHOWS THAT OTHER TREATMENTS AND MEDS HAVE BEEN ABSOLUTELY USELESS.

I have 3 letters from the WA. DOH which clearly states that if I had been seen in wa. st. and made the same complaint about THCF and their doctors, they would take action and shut them down immediately....so if ya feel lucky, write a complaint to the DOH and see what they respond with..lol.

I don't have anything to complain about, I am happy with my doctor.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by justpics

I don't have anything to complain about, I am happy with my doctor.

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YOU MISSED MY POINT HERE.LOL.:wtf:

you make globs, not points :rastasmoke:

Quote:

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Originally Posted by justpics

you make globs, not points :rastasmoke:

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I make points with globs, since we are in nothing but, GLOBS here in wa....have you been following any wa. MMJ cases? They are nothing but, globs of bullshit..:thumbsup:

The "SPECIAL" controlled substance DA in my case even said an authorization is like a drivers license...so who globed who?? lol. A DRIVERS LICENSE?? HUH?

esplain that one if you can, since it has nothing to do with MMJ or an authorization, nor any agency giving out I.D. cards for any lawful cannabis related uses.

I even have more silly claims than that from the SPECIAL DA!!

This right here is pretty clear that since a 1yr. expiration date is not in any cannabis defense statute the legislature enacted in rcw 69.50 or 69.51A..the courts cannot convict anyone for having an expired authorization.:thumbsup:

For those whom have been wondering what this old outdated court case is about...pay attention.


"Another reason for strict construction is to protect the individual against arbitrary discretion by officials and judges. . . . A related argument is to the effect that since the power to declare what conduct is subject to penal sanctions is legislative rather than judicial, it would risk judicial usurpation of the legislative function for a court to enforce a penalty where the legislature had not clearly and unequivocally prescribed it. In other words, before a person can be punished his case must be plainly and unmistakably within the statute sought to be applied. Thus one court has stated that the reason for the rule was 'to guard against the creation, by judicial construction, of criminal offenses not within the contemplation of the legislature.' It has also been asserted that since the state makes the laws, they should be most strongly construed against it.

An individuals right to due process, secured by the U.S Const., Amend. 14 â??Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of lawâ?�. and Wa. Const. art. 1 sec. 3 â??No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of lawâ?�., which includes in both, the fundamental notions of fair notice and equal enforcement of the laws. The void for vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness (1972).
A criminal statute must provide fair notice to avoid â??arbitrary, erratic and discriminatory enforcement.â?� City of Seattle v. Douglas, 115 Wn.2d 171, 180 (1990). Applying this principle, courts have not hesitated to invalidate statutes which failed to satisfy due process. See e.g. Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (ordinance making it a crime to congregate in a manner that was â?? annoyingâ?� to others vague); State v. Williams, 144 Wn.2d 197 (2002)(statute criminalizing threats to â??mental healthâ?� of another void for vagueness); Bellevue v. Lorang, 140 Wn.2d 19 (2000 )(telephone threat ordinance, providing defense for caller if purpose was legitimate communication, void for vagueness); State v. Sansone, 127 Wn.App. 630, 639 (2005) (the term â??pornographyâ?�, as used in a community placement order, was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the due process clause).

The due process doctrine seeks to â??ensureâ?� that the public has adequate notice of what conduct is proscribed and to â??ensureâ?� that the public is protected from arbitrary enforcement. State v. Riles, 135 Wn.2d 326, 348, 957 P.2d 655 (1998)
The Fourteenth Amendmentâ??s due process vagueness doctrine has a twofold purpose: (1) to provide the public with adequate notice of what conduct is proscribed and 2) to protect the public from arbitrary or ad-hoc enforcement. City of Bellevue v. Lorang , 140 Wn.2d 19, 30, 992 P.2d 496 (2000) ; State v. Williams, 144 Wn.2d 197, 203, 26 P.3d 890 (2001). A law violates due process vagueness prohibitions if either requirement is satisfied. Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171, 177, 795 P.2d 693 (1990)
A statute fails to provide the required notice if it forbids the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. State v. Watson, 160bWn.2d 1, 7, 154 P.3d 909 (2007); Myrick v. Board of Peirce Cy. Commâ??rs, 102 Wn.2d 698 P.2d 1152 (1984)
â??A vague law impermissibly delegates basic public policy matters to policemen, judges and juries for resolution on an ad-hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.â?� A statute is void if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222(1972).

The supreme court of Washington has consistently held that the fixing of legal punishments for criminal offenses is a legislative function. State v. Pillatos, 159, Wn.2d 459, 150 P.3d 1130 (2007)..
When interpreting a statute, every presumption should favor the act of the legislature and all doubts should be resolved in support of the act. Grant v. Spellman, 99 Wn.2d 815, 819, 664 P.2d 1227 (1983).
Vagueness in a statute raises an issue of procedural due process. The crucial question is whether the statute provides fair notice of the â??conductâ?� prohibited. Blondheim v. State, 84 Wn.2d 874, 878, 529 P.2d 1096 (1975). â?? One to whose conduct a statute â??clearlyâ?� applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756, 41 L.Ed 2d 439, 94 S.Ct. 2547 (1974).

The mere fact that a personâ??s conduct must be subjectively evaluated by a police officer to determine if that person has violated a statute does not make that statute unconstitutionally vague. If this were so, most criminal statutes would be void for vagueness. What is forbidden by the due process clause are criminal statutes that contain â??no standardsâ?� and allow police officers, judges and jury to subjectively decide what conduct the statute proscribes or what conduct will comply with a statute in any given case. State v. Maciolek, 101 Wn.2d 259, 267, 676 P.2d 996 (1984).

To ascertain legislative intent, a court will first look at the plain language of the statute. State v. Reding, 119 Wn.2d 685, 690, 835 P.2d 1019 (1992). State v. Glas, 147 Wn.2d 410, 54 P.3d 147 (2002). The courts primary objective is ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. State v. Radan, 143 Wn.2d 323, 21 P.3d 255 (2001). If a statute is unambiguous it is not subject to judicial interpretation and itâ??s meaning is derived from the statute alone and the court is to assume the legislature meant exactly what it says. State v. Chester, 133 Wn.2d 15, 21, 940 P.2d 1374 (1997), Glas, 147 Wn.2d at 415, Radan, 143 Wn.2d at 330, State v. Keller, 143 Wn.2d 267, 19 P.3d 1030 (2001). Courts may not add language to a clear statute even if the court(s) believe the legislature intended something else but failed to express it adequately. Glas, 147 Wn.2d at 417 citing Chester 133 Wn.2d at 21.
City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171, 182, 795 P.2d 693 (1990) The Challenged statute â??is tested for unconstitutional vagueness by inspecting the actual conduct of the party who challenges the ordinance and not by examining hypothetical situations at the periphery of the ordinanceâ??s scope.â?� Id. At 182-83. Vagueness doctrine requires both a failure to define and failure to prevent arbitrary enforcement, if the challenger proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, the lack of either requirement, the statute is void for vagueness. Id. At 178
Under the definiteness prong, a statute is void for vagueness if persons â??of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. â?? Haley, 117 Wn.2d at 739 (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926). When determining whether the statute provides fair warning of the proscribed conduct, we examine the context of entire enactment, giving the language a â??sensible, meaningful, and practical interpretation.â?� Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 180. But we do not require absolute specificity and agreement. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 179.

Under the arbitrary enforcement prong, the statute is unconstitutional if it â??invites an inordinate amount of police discretion.â?� Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 181. As read in context, we determine whether the statute contains â??inherently subjective terms.â?� Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 181 (quoting State v. Maciolek, 101 Wn.2d 259, 267, [*189] 676 P.2d 996 (1984)). To pass constitutional muster, the statute must provide adequate enforcement standards. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 181.
Bellevue v. Miller, 85 Wn.2d 539, 536 P.2d 603 (1975), the court struck down an ordinance which prohibited wandering and prowling â??in a place, at a time, or in a manner. And under circumstances, which manifest an unlawful purpose.â?� Bellevue, at 542. The ordinance also had a list of circumstances evidencing an unlawful purpose. The problem with the ordinance at issue in Bellevue was the indefiniteness that flowed from the terms â??wanderingâ?� and â??prowlingâ?� and â??unlawfulâ?�. See Maciolek, at 267-68. The main vice of the ordinance was not that the indefiniteness [**1386] failed to give adequate notice of the proscribed conduct, but that it presented too much potential for arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement by placing â??no actual limitationsâ?¦on the exercise of police discretion.â?� Bellevue, [***40] at 545. The ordinance permitted arrest on the mere suspicion that a person has been or is likely to become involved in unlawful activity. Bellevue, at 546.

As such Bellevue v. Miller, supra, stands for the proposition that the primary concern for the vagueness doctrine is â?? lack of effective limits on police discretion.â?� See e.g. Kolender v. Lawson, supra. In Bellevue, we essentially determined that the ordinance had no â??hard coreâ?� because it placed no actual limits on police discretion.(see state v. Fry) It logically follows that an ordinance which fails to give law enforcement sufficient clear notice of the prohibited conduct does not give the general public notice of the conduct it purports to prohibit. See generally Dan-Cohen, Decision rules and conduct rules: On Acoustic Seperation in criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 648-64 (1984)( Analyzing the void-for-vagueness doctrine in terms of a distinction between conduct rules directed toward the population at large and the decision rules directed toward a particular profession and legal audience).

Intent -- 2007 c 371: "The legislature intends to clarify the law on medical marijuana so that the lawful use of this substance is not impaired and medical practitioners are able to exercise their best professional judgment in the delivery of medical treatment, qualifying patients may fully participate in the medical use of marijuana, and designated providers may assist patients in the manner provided by this act without fear of state criminal prosecution. This act is also intended to provide clarification to law enforcement and to all participants in the judicial system." [2007 c 371 § 1.]

RCW 69.51A.060
Crimes â?? Limitations of chapter.



*** CHANGE IN 2010 *** (SEE 5798-S.SL) ***

(1) It shall be a misdemeanor to use or display medical marijuana in a manner or place which is open to the view of the general public.

(2) Nothing in this chapter requires any health insurance provider to be liable for any claim for reimbursement for the medical use of marijuana.

(3) Nothing in this chapter requires any physician to authorize the use of medical marijuana for a patient.

(4) Nothing in this chapter requires any accommodation of any on-site medical use of marijuana in any place of employment, in any school bus or on any school grounds, in any youth center, in any correctional facility, or smoking medical marijuana in any public place as that term is defined in RCW 70.160.020.

(5) It is a class C felony to fraudulently produce any record purporting to be, or tamper with the content of any record for the purpose of having it accepted as, valid documentation under *RCW 69.51A.010(6)(a).

(6) No person shall be entitled to claim the affirmative defense provided in RCW 69.51A.040 for engaging in the medical use of marijuana in a way that endangers the health or well-being of any person through the use of a motorized vehicle on a street, road, or highway.

RCW 69.51A.050
Medical marijuana, lawful possession â?? State not liable.


(1) The lawful possession or manufacture of medical marijuana as authorized by this chapter shall not result in the forfeiture or seizure of any property.

RCW 69.51A.080
Adoption of rules by the department of health â?? Sixty-day supply for qualifying patients.


(1) By July 1, 2008, the department of health shall adopt rules defining the quantity of marijuana that could reasonably be presumed to be a sixty-day supply for qualifying patients; this presumption may be overcome with evidence of a qualifying patient's necessary medical use.

(2) As used in this chapter, "sixty-day supply" means that amount of marijuana that qualifying patients would reasonably be expected to need over a period of sixty days for their personal medical use. During the rule-making process, the department shall make a good faith effort to include all stakeholders identified in the rule-making analysis as being impacted by the rule.


RCW 69.51A.020
Construction of chapter.


Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede Washington state law prohibiting the acquisition, possession, manufacture, sale, or use of marijuana for nonmedical purposes.

[1999 c 2 § 3 (Initiative Measure No. 692, approved November 3, 1998).]

RCW 69.51A.040
Failure to seize marijuana, qualifying patients' affirmative defense.


(1) If a law enforcement officer determines that marijuana is being possessed lawfully under the medical marijuana law, the officer may document the amount of marijuana, take a representative sample that is large enough to test, but not seize the marijuana. A law enforcement officer or agency shall not be held civilly liable for failure to seize marijuana in this circumstance.

(2) If charged with a violation of state law relating to marijuana, any qualifying patient who is engaged in the medical use of marijuana, or any designated provider who assists a qualifying patient in the medical use of marijuana, will be deemed to have established an affirmative defense to such charges by proof of his or her compliance with the requirements provided in this chapter. Any person meeting the requirements appropriate to his or her status under this chapter shall be considered to have engaged in activities permitted by this chapter and shall not be penalized in any manner, or denied any right or privilege, for such actions.

(3) A qualifying patient, if eighteen years of age or older, or a designated provider shall:

(a) Meet all criteria for status as a qualifying patient or designated provider;

(b) Possess no more marijuana than is necessary for the patient's personal, medical use, not exceeding the amount necessary for a sixty-day supply; and

(c) Present his or her valid documentation to any law enforcement official who questions the patient or provider regarding his or her medical use of marijuana.

(4) A qualifying patient, if under eighteen years of age at the time he or she is alleged to have committed the offense, shall demonstrate compliance with subsection (3)(a) and (c) of this section. However, any possession under subsection (3)(b) of this section, as well as any production, acquisition, and decision as to dosage and frequency of use, shall be the responsibility of the parent or legal guardian of the qualifying patient.

[2007 c 371 § 5; 1999 c 2 § 5 (Initiative Measure No. 692, approved November 3, 1998).]

WAC 246-75-010

Medical marijuana.

Medical marijuana.
(1) Purpose. The purpose of this section is to define the amount of marijuana a qualifying patient could reasonably expect to need over a sixty-day period for their personal medical use. It is intended to:

(a) Allow medical practitioners to exercise their best professional judgment in the delivery of medical treatment;

(b) Allow designated providers to assist patients in the manner provided in chapter 69.51A RCW; and

(c) Provide clarification to patients, law enforcement and others in the use of medical marijuana.

(2) Definitions.

(a) "Designated provider" means a person as defined in RCW 69.51A.010.

(b) "Plant" means any marijuana plant in any stage of growth.

(c) "Qualifying patient" means a person as defined in RCW 69.51A.010.

(d) "Useable marijuana" means the dried leaves and flowers of the Cannabis plant family Moraceae. Useable marijuana excludes stems, stalks, seeds and roots.

(3) Presumptive sixty-day supply.

(a) A qualifying patient and a designated provider may possess a total of no more than twenty-four ounces of useable marijuana, and no more than fifteen plants.

(b) Amounts listed in (a) of this subsection are total amounts of marijuana between both a qualifying patient and a designated provider.

(c) The presumption in this section may be overcome with evidence of a qualifying patient's necessary medical use.



[Statutory Authority: RCW 69.51A.080 and 2007 c 371. 08-21-001, § 246-75-010, filed 10/2/08, effective 11/2/08.]

I see nothing which complies with due process here above since the legislature never proscribed any criminal sanctions for an "expired" authorization by time, place nor manner...simply doesn't exist..no place in the entire chapter..and the rest of the chapter applies to practitioner sanctions only which do not transfer to the patient because they are mostly dealing with administrative sanctions against the practitioner. or leo,county discriminatory policy,custom or usage..and "all" involved in the judicial processes.

5798-S.SL

http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/WSL.../5798-S.SL.pdf :D

I have had some discussions which have opined this section is the place the "expiration" exists as a 1st amend. "right" of the const. to "limit" the speech to 1 yr. (see conant v. walters)...

(3) Nothing in this chapter requires any physician to authorize the use of medical marijuana for a patient.


The statutes operative language seems to disagree..

YET, the judge in my specific case disagreed with the state and agreed with me, NOTHING MENTIONED IN THE WHOLE CHAPTER ABOUT 1 YR. EXPIRATION MANDATED DATES INVALIDATES AN AUTHORIZATION ALREADY SIGNED(DATE OR NOT EXPIRING IT.)and went into statutory construction and opined(without facts & conclusions) that since I had 2 authorizations for differant conditions for the same drug, my 2004 was superseded by the "limited" 1 yr. authorization by reason of it being for the same drug "only"...then opined that the court doesn't understand if a dr. is able to authorize a specific treatment why the same dr. can't limit, change the course or eliminate said treatment to be in compliance with the statue's intent...the professional opinion of the dr..

Well, he is correct in the sense of across the board without a case by case examination of the facts to the laws..

For example, if your treatment of using mmj worsens your condition, then well, he is on point...

But, if your condition relies on your use to live or be without chronic pain, say like with any condition in section (a)...then he is completely wrong, cause that would cause harm and put the dr. at jeopardy for being outside the standards of care... some conditions require a dr. to mitigate the symptoms with because there is nothing else available to them because of the "COMPLEXITY" of the condition(s)...and can't be changed due to life or slow death which is cruel and unusual...

Oh, I forgot..my dr. wasn't the one who claimed I was guilty, nor did the state claim I provided fraudulent documents..or altered..as a matter of fact..I asked those specific questions...because that's what the legislature proscribed as to my conduct...

:beatdeadhorse: ok its dead

Quote:

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Originally Posted by justpics

:beatdeadhorse: ok its dead

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O.K. so I think we need an appellate judges rulings, or a supreme ct. ruling...to be "truly" beaten dead in all due respects...isn't this what you told me just at the beginning of the yr ??...but, for expost-facto and quo warranto??:wtf:

This is the correct ave...isn't it?? or is it all 3 or none of them?? :D:stoned:

It ain't a dead hoarse beaten till we cap it the right way..lol.

Just like the gulf oil leak/spill...ain't done till it's capped off right and no-more comes out.

I think the disconnect here may be considering some clinics to be "doc-in-the-box's".
The law isn't written to only allow health care professionals with or at private practices. The way it's written explains that the health care professional licensed under the appropriate chapters have the right and authority to recommend medical marijuana.
Now, on the renewal/expiration issue. Some clinics are a little dishonest, or they don't quite give all of the information. There's actually nothing written in the laws stating that the recommendation ever expires. HOWEVER, if a recommendation is written with an expiration date, it can be interpreted that the Dr is terminating the recommendation on that date, depending on the judge, jury etc. How does the judge know that you're "scheduled to be better" by that date?
The renewal at our clinic covers all of the benefits included with a membership, and is only $100. We also offer programs with yearly renewals and three year renewals. This means that your membership is valid with us until the expiration date passes. This means that we will go to bat for you in the unfortunate event something should happen all the way until your membership expires.
Now of course we don't want your membership to expire, because we want to be able to defend you as much as possible. But, if you can't keep up with your membership costs, and aren't eligible for our scholarship program, you'll have to defend your expired authorization. And again that's possible, but it boils down to the judge and jury you get. But it does appear precedence has been set already anyways, so a lapsed recommendation may be dependable. But, that's a risky venture right there if you ask me.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by Satica

I think the disconnect here may be considering some clinics to be "doc-in-the-box's".
The law isn't written to only allow health care professionals with or at private practices. The way it's written explains that the health care professional licensed under the appropriate chapters have the right and authority to recommend medical marijuana.
Now, on the renewal/expiration issue. Some clinics are a little dishonest, or they don't quite give all of the information. There's actually nothing written in the laws stating that the recommendation ever expires. HOWEVER, if a recommendation is written with an expiration date, it can be interpreted that the Dr is terminating the recommendation on that date, depending on the judge, jury etc. How does the judge know that you're "scheduled to be better" by that date?
The renewal at our clinic covers all of the benefits included with a membership, and is only $100. We also offer programs with yearly renewals and three year renewals. This means that your membership is valid with us until the expiration date passes. This means that we will go to bat for you in the unfortunate event something should happen all the way until your membership expires.
Now of course we don't want your membership to expire, because we want to be able to defend you as much as possible. But, if you can't keep up with your membership costs, and aren't eligible for our scholarship program, you'll have to defend your expired authorization. And again that's possible, but it boils down to the judge and jury you get. But it does appear precedence has been set already anyways, so a lapsed recommendation may be dependable. But, that's a risky venture right there if you ask me.

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Actually, the clinics have no expertise in the practice of medicine..i.e. the registered shareholder/owner(s) of the fictitious name...you can't say or do squat for anyone....and 3yr recommendations clearly shows you have commercialized the patient-practitioner relationship...which is against public policy... so you actually have already seriously misinformed people from the start, care to try again?

:beatdeadhorse:

And also remember that in Washington you don't need a medical authorization to use MMJ. You will have the same burden in court to prove that you have a qualifying condition. All you need is some good solid medical history.