Want Liberty?

http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig3/carden2.html

Want Liberty?

by Art Carden

So the state is too big, too parasitic, too warlike. What do we do about it?

Regardless of our particular view, the important fact is that "the state is," whether we like it or not. So how do we reduce its size and scope?

Writing for LRC is one way. Getting a PhD in economics or a related discipline and finding oneself in a position to influence policy is another. But these are relatively costly â?? articles take a lot of time to write and getting a PhD from a "good school" can take upwards of five years. Given these relatively high costs, Iâ??m surprised at the number of conservatives and libertarians who donâ??t vote. Voting is relatively costless, you donâ??t have to surrender any information that the state doesnâ??t have already, and it provides a convenient way in which you can signal your preferences in a forum where legislators actually pay attention. And yet so few people take the time to do it.

Iâ??ve heard a number of curious arguments both for and against the practice. Iâ??ve been told that to refrain from voting is to neglect my "civic duty" and to forfeit my right to disagree with the outcome. Iâ??ve been told that voting to influence the outcome of an election is pointless. Iâ??ve also been told that to vote is to acquiesce to (at best) or heartily endorse (at worst) the evils of the state.

The first contention can be disposed of handily. Nowhere in the body of natural law theory (or in the US Constitution, for legal positivists) does it say that one forfeits his right to disagree with the outcome of an election if he doesnâ??t vote. The non-voter retains the right to complain, and to complain loudly. But complaining, again, can be rather costly.

The second argument is spot-on. At the margin, one vote doesnâ??t matter. George W. Bush will win Alabama whether Lew Rockwell votes for him or not. Bush or Kerry will win Missouri by at least several hundred votes no matter what I do on election day. Since others have elaborated on the pointlessness of voting to influence the outcome of elections extensively, I wonâ??t do so here.

The third argument usually proceeds as follows: the state is a monopolist on allegedly "legitimate" violence (it is). Michael Badnarik, for example, is running on a platform that condones the use of the state to tax and regulate to some degree. Therefore, to vote for Michael Badnarik is to condone the use of the state to tax and regulate. Taxation and regulation are illegitimate, so voting is immoral.

I disagree on two counts. First, voting for Badnarik does not necessarily require that the voter endorse every aspect of his platform. It merely signals that the voter prefers Michael Badnarikâ??s platform to the other available options.

My second disagreement is more practical. It addresses a slogan that was popular among some of my libertarian friends in the 2000 election: "I vote by not voting." I think of elections using an analogy. Imagine an array of people who are vying, via democratic election, for the privilege of kicking you in the stomach and taking money out of your wallet. You know with absolute certainty that you will be kicked and robbed. Avoiding the kicking/robbing treatment is not an option unless you are willing to lose your life. For what itâ??s worth, Iâ??m grateful for the opportunity to vote for the guy who will kick the softest and take the least.

The same friends were also fond of the slogan "what if they gave an election and no one showed up?" I think the answer is pretty clear: first, someone will always show up because the state can, by its very existence, enrich him. Voting and non-voting do not change the fact that some organization has a comparative advantage in violence. They merely change the way that violence is used. Second, the state would probably go on its authoritarian merry way â?? indeed, the state has grown faster in recent decades despite declining voter turnout.

Beyond even this, how are we â?? or more importantly, policymakers â?? to interpret the non-voterâ??s signal? A non-vote is ambiguous: not everyone who abstains from voting is an anti-statist, and very few politicians are going to read the 25+ articles in the LRC non-voting archive to discover why some principled libertarians arenâ??t voting. Non-voting sends an ambiguous signal. On the other, voting sends a clear, cheap signal that everyone can understand, and that signal is as follows: "given that weâ??re going to be kicked and robbed, I would rather Michael Badnarik do the kicking and robbing than any of the other guys because he has promised to do less of it."

How can we tell voting matters? Itâ??s pretty simple, really. Those with a stake in the outcome of any election (labor unions, corporate lobbyists, etc) spend huge sums of money on voter registration, voter education, turn-out-the-vote drives, and political ads. Someone is paying attention.

One of the problems of democratic government (or the state in general) is that policymakers are often beholden to special interests who can accumulate power and wealth by a variety of taxes, spending measures, and regulations. It stands to reason that conservatives and libertarians can accumulate power and wealth by the same measures: power in the sense that we can regain control of our day-to-day affairs by reducing state interference, and wealth by reducing the burden of the stateâ??s fiscal and regulatory behemoth.

This gets at the heart of a question that invariably comes up at any Mises Institute event â?? Mises University, the Rothbard Graduate Seminar, or something else â?? is some variant of "how can we make Misesâ?? & Rothbardâ??s vision operational?" In other words, "how can we get less government?" I think part of the answer is pretty simple: by voting for it.

October 30, 2004

Art Carden [send him mail] studies economics at Washington University in Saint Louis, where he is a Fellow of the Center for New Institutional Social Sciences. He is also a Fellow of the Institute for Humane Studies and a former Summer Research Fellow at the Ludwig von Mises Institute.