Some Say Iran's Weapons Come From Russia(and possibilities of Shkvals from China)

Some Say Iran's Weapons Come From Russia (and possibilities of Shkvals from China)

Associated Press via Yahoo! News ^ | 2005 Apr 4 | Lee Keath


CAIRO, Egypt - Iran has unveiled with great fanfare a series of what it portrays as sophisticated, homegrown weapons â?? flying boats and missiles invisible to radar, torpedoes too fast to elude.

But experts said Tuesday it appears much of the technology came from Russia and questioned Iran's claims about the weapons' capabilities.

Still, the armaments, tested during war games by some 17,000 Revolutionary Guards in the Persian Gulf, send what may be Iran's real message: its increased ability to hit oil tankers if tension with America turns to outright confrontation.

To underline that message, the maneuvers â?? code-named "The Great Prophet" â?? have been held since Friday around the Strait of Hormuz, the 34-mile-wide entrance to the Gulf through which about two-fifths of the world's oil supplies pass.

Throughout the war games, Iran has touted what it calls technological leaps in its weapons production. In recent years, Iran revved up its arms programs after long relying on purchases abroad to keep up its aging arsenal, hampered by U.S. sanctions and Washington's pressure on other countries against selling weapons to Tehran.

The head of the Revolutionary Guards, Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi, proclaimed Tuesday that Iran was now able to defend itself against "any extra-regional invasion."

It was a clear reference to Iranian worries of potential U.S. military action to stop its nuclear program, which Washington claims is intended to produce nuclear weapons. Iran says it aims only to generate electricity, but has so far defied U.N. Security Council demands that it give up key parts of its program.

The new weapons, many of them shown on Iranian state TV during their tests, have come with impressive claims:

â?¢ A missile, the Fajr-3, that is invisible to radar and able to strike several targets with multiple warheads.

â?¢ A high-speed torpedo, the Hoot, able to move at some 223 mph, up to four times faster than a normal torpedo, and fired by ships cloaked to radar.

â?¢ A surface-to-sea missile, the Kowsar, with remote-control and searching systems that cannot be scrambled.

â?¢ A "super-modern flying boat," undetectable by radar and able to launch missiles with precise targeting while skimming low over the surface of the water at a top speed of 100 nautical mph.

There are questions over Iran's claims. In Washington, Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said "the Iranians have been known to boast and exaggerate" their weapons capabilities.

And some experts cast doubt on just how radar-evading Iran's ships and missiles are.

Iran's radars are not as advanced as those of Israel, for example â?? meaning that perhaps the weapons can avoid the radar that Iran has access to, but not more advanced types, said Meir Javedanfar, an Iranian-born, Israel-based analyst.

"The question here is, what radar did they test their own weapons against? If it's the radar they've been using for all these years, then that's not saying 100 percent that these things are undetectable," he said.

Others questioned if Iran developed the weapons on its own.

The Hoot torpedo â?? the name means "whale" â?? closely resembles the Russian-made VA-111 Shkval, the world's fastest known underwater missile, developed in 1995, said Ruslan Pukhov of Moscow's Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies.

The Shkval attains high speeds by coating itself in a cocoon of air bubbles, reducing friction, and Pukhov said its technology was too sophisticated for the Iranians to produce themselves.

"Hypothetically, they could get access to the Shkval technology, but if so, I don't think they got it through Russian channels," he said.

Pukhov noted the former Soviet republic of Kyrgyzstan once had a Soviet torpedo testing center on the remote mountain lake of Issyk-Kul. And he said that in the turmoil that followed the Soviet breakup, Kyrgyz authorities sold Shkvals to the Chinese, a major importer of Iranian oil.

Kanybek Tabaldiyev, a senior official with a Kyrgyz company that makes torpedo and other military hardware at Issyk-Kul, denied his company transferred sophisticated technology to Iran. He said it was possible weaponry had been acquired through other means.

Chinese officials had no immediate comment on whether their country provided Iran with Shkvals.

China has been pursuing closer relations with Tehran in hopes of help in meeting its energy needs, and the United States has sanctioned Chinese companies in the past, accusing them of violating international controls on transfers of weapons technology to Iran. Beijing has protested the U.S. sanctions and in 2003, it issued its first regulations controlling exports of missile, nuclear and biological weapons technology.

Whatever the Iranian armaments' capabilities â?? or origins â?? they likely won't greatly affect the military balance of power in the Gulf, where the U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet is based, operating out of the island nation of Bahrain.

For example, the Hoot torpedo â?? if indeed based on the Shkval â?? has too short a range, about 7,500 yards, to be militarily significant, said Pavel Felgenhauer, a Russian analyst.

But Iran may be aiming to show the world, and its people, that it has options if the standoff over its nuclear program escalates. That could boost its hand in negotiations with the United States and Europe.

"They know they are inferior to the U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf, so this is their way of telling Americans .... we are not the only ones who would lose out if talks regarding the nuclear program fail," Javedanfar said.

The torpedo tests in particular are significant, he said.

"They know that if you sink one tanker in the Strait of Hormuz you can stop all shipping there, because the waters are quite shallow," he said.

Good find Torog i was reading about it the other day. Those torpedos can be armed with nuclear warheads as well. I wouldnt be suprised if russia was, they are supposed to turn on us in the end times. Looks like they noticed how we like to play both sides and wanted to have their turn at it....

http://globalpolitician.com/articled...90&cid=2&sid=4

Russia's Special Relationship With Iran's Mullahs
Natalya Hmelik - 3/27/2006
Last November Russia signed $1bn contract for export of weapons to Iran. Under the contract Russia is to supply the Tehran regime with 29 surface-to-air missile systems Tor-M1 (SA-15 GAUNTLET) and a consignment of military boats, and to upgrade Iran's Soviet-made bombers and fighter jets, in 2006. The deal was declared to be another triumph of Russian defense firms and the Rosoboronexport arms dealer as it is worth of about one fifth of arms export revenues for 2005.Test

Meanwhile the deal raised concerns in the West. Russian analysts said the main reason was the West's "military plans" over Iran. They mean the United States' and Israel's willingness to destroy Iranian nuclear facilities and point out that the both countries' air forces will undoubtedly strike as soon as their administrations manage to prove the existence of Tehran's nuclear weapon program. In such circumstances, Russian experts say, the West sees an effective air defense system deployed in Iran as undesirable.

When negotiating the deal with Moscow Tehran insisted than it needed the Tor systems to defend a peaceful project, the nuclear power station under constriction in Bushehr. In 2002, Russia supplied and started assembling a nuclear reactor there under the $800m contract. The reactor is only a part of a wider Russian-Iranian program for nuclear cooperation. The $8,5bn program includes construction of six nuclear reactors throughout Iran.

Iran's nuclear program was launched by Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlevi in 1974. Five years later, the revolution of 1979 brought to power Ayatollah Khomeini who believed nuclear weapons to be "immoral and inhuman" and immediately halted all nuclear projects including the Bushehr power plant at that time being built by Germans. Some analysts say that Tehran reconsidered its attitude towards WMD after the war with Iraq of 1980-88, when Saddam Hussein's military used chemical weapons against Iran. By the end of the war, large deposits of uranium had been discovered in Iran and the main problem was the lack of expertise. Russia and China has become major suppliers of nuclear know-how to Tehran. The negotiations with Moscow started in 1988.

A Russian official taking part in the negotiations said: "The Iranians were interested in everything. They were ready to buy any weapons. They were ready to pay in any form and even offered Russian negotiators to bring trunks of dollars upon the shipment of Russian weapons. To Russian officials' credit they rejected this unusual form of payment". However Ariel Cohen and James A. Phillips from The Heritage Foundation in Washington in 2001 wrote that "up to $25 million changed hands to facilitate Tehran's access to Russian advanced technology".

Since early '90s, Russian universities have admitted students from Iran to nuclear physics studies. Many Iranians study in Nizhny Novgorod, not far from the closed city of Sarov (former Arzamas-16). It was Arzamas-16 where in the '50s Yuri Khariton and Andrei Sakharov developed Soviet H-bomb. At present the city hosts the Federal Nuclear Center, and some prominent nuclear physicists who work there do lecturing in Nizhny Novgorod University.

At the same time, in early '90s, Tehran started rebuilding research infrastructure for development of nuclear weapons. At first the regime fully cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency but already in 1991 Iran banned IAEA inspectors to visit its nuclear facilities without advance notice. The ban came at the same moment as the decision to accomplish the construction of the Bushehr power plant. The Germans refused of finishing the project. The negotiations with China and Brazil also failed. And in 1995, Iran made contract with Russia. Some Western experts pointed out that the design of the Bushehr reactor allowed to use it for making of weapon-grade nuclear materials. Under the contract Russia also was to train the staff of the power plant that meant the transfer of not only know-how but also of expertise accelerating Iran's nuclear research.

After the recent Tor contract and with strong Western criticism Russian media were fast to point out that it was Americans who forced Russia to sell weapons to Iran. According to them, under Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement of 2000, the United States should have promoted Russian weapons in global markets in exchange for the cessation of Russian arms trade with Iran. As Washington has dishonored its promise, they added, Moscow decided to forget its one.

The problem is that Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement of 2000 never existed: by that time Victor Chernomyrdin, former Russian prime minister, was Russia's Ambassador to Ukraine. The Russian-American intergovernmental commission co-chaired by U.S. Vice-President Albert Gore and Russian Prime-Minister Chernomyrdin did exist but it worked in 1995. At one of its meetings Mr. Gore warned Mr. Chernomyrdin that the United States might impose sanctions on Russia selling weapons to Iran. The law co-authored by then Senator Gore and Senator John McCain and passed in 1992, called for sanctions against nations providing rogue states sponsoring terrorism, including Iran, with state-of-the-art military hardware. Mr. Chernomyrdin however managed to find necessary arguments and explain Mr. Gore that Russia had to push through the supplies of Kilo-class submarines, torpedoes and armored vehicles under the existing contracts with Iran. As a result, on June 30 1995, Messrs. Gore and Chernomyrdin signed the secret agreement allowing Russia to continue weapon supplies to Tehran. Russia pledged to restrain from providing the Islamic Republic with state-of-the-art conventional and "destabilizing" weapon systems.

Mr. Gore, in violation of the U.S. laws, promised not to brief the Congress of the agreement in exchange for Mr. Chernomyrdin's promise to stop arms trade with Tehran by 1999. In 1996-99 covered by the agreement, Russia sold military hardware worth of $200m to Iran. Moreover, on December 9 1995, Mr. Chernomyrdin sent Mr. Gore a letter reminding "Dear Al" of the promise to get U.S. administration's concessions with regards of nuclear cooperation between Moscow and Tehran. The Prime Minister stressed that nuclear the program Russia helped Iran to develop was the peaceful one. Later, in 2000, Mr. Gore justified his secret agreements with Mr. Chernomyrdin by the desire to limit the transfer of Russian nuclear know-how to Iran with construction of two reactors.

The secret agreement was exposed in the fall of 2000, by that time it was supposed to expire. But Russian main arms dealer, then ? the Rosvooruzhenie agency, told Russian reporters that the agreement expire date was December 31 2000. That arbitrary shift of date might be the only reason why Russian media are now talking of the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement of 2000. But in any case the mutual understanding of the two top officials allowed Iran to get a lot of Russian conventional weapons. In addition to the subs, torpedoes and armored personal carriers, Tehran bought MiG-29 fighters, which equal or surpass F-15C in several areas, and Su-24 (Fencer) fighter-bombers, spare parts for them and maintenance services. Russia also transferred missile technologies facilitating the development of Iranian Shahab-3 intermediate range ballistic missiles. With the range of 1,200 kilometers those missiles can hit targets throughout the Middle East.

In November 2000, Russia announced that it had unilaterally denounced Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement which, it claimed, was to expire on December 31 2001. It launched intensive preparations for the visit of then Iranian President Mohammad Khatami. In December 2000, then Russian Defense minister Igor Sergeev visited Tehran. He and his Iranian counterpart Admiral Ali Shamkhani discussed 10-year program of military and technical cooperation worth of more than $3bn. Mr. Sergeev made it clear that Russia was ready to help Iran build sophisticated air defense, upgrade military aircraft and other weapons.

President Khatami came to Moscow on March 12, 2001. The day before Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov said in an interview that Russia would develop military and technical cooperation with Iran in the same way it cooperated with any other country. "It is by no means a taboo and everybody should understand that," he added.

Meanwhile Russian defense analysts speculated what military hardware Iran might be interested in. Konstantin Makienko from Moscow Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies wrote: "First of all, Iran might want short-range air defense systems capable to combat against high-precision guided bombs rather than aircraft". He pointed out that Tor-M1 was "excellent" against that kind of shells. Some experts supposed that President Khatami would ask President Vladimir Putin to consider supply of anti-ship Moskit (Sunburn) missiles to Iran. During the war with Iraq Iran lost almost all its battleships and in 2000, started building new destroyers. While Iran was capable to produce onboard launch systems it had to buy missiles somewhere. Russian supersonic self-guiding Moskit might be the choice.

Before 1999, Iran purchased plenty of Russian tanks and planes and by 2001 faced an urgent problem of spare parts for them. Iranians visited Saint Petersburg nuclear-reactor factory where Mr. Khatami made it clear that Tehran wished to buy more Russian reactors. Iran also decided to buy surface-air missiles Osa (SA-8 Gecko) and Tor-M1. At the joint press-conference Mr. Putin said that "Iran has the right to maintain its security and defense capability" while Russia "has economic reasons" for supply of weapons to Tehran. After Mr. Khatami's four-day visit Rosoboronexport arms dealer estimated that military and technical cooperation with Iran might bring Russia up to $300m a year.

Russian analysts then talked of the prospects for cooperation with the Islamic Republic. Some of them pointed out that Iran should have become the guarantor of stability in the Middle East and therefore needed to upgrade its military: To equip the Air Forces with new-generation aircraft, to replace the whole fleets of armored vehicles and warships, to strengthen its air defense. The experts predicted the contracts for Su-27 (Flanker) and Su-30 fighters, Ka-50 (HOKUM Black Shark) and Ka-52 (HOKUM Werewolf) battle helicopters, T-90C and T-80U tanks, missile boats armed with anti-ship missiles Moskit and Yakhont.

According to them, the first stage of Iran's military upgrade would require $7bn-$10bn. Mikhail Dmitriev, the head of Russian Commission for military and technical cooperation with foreign nations, then told a press-conference that "within the next five years" Iran might become the third largest consumer of Russian weapons after China and India. He pointed out that the export of Russian military hardware was growing and "under the circumstances, in the next decade Russia will strengthen its position in the global weapons market owing to its presence in unconventional markets including Iran".

Russian defense firms were looking forward to the visit of Iran's Defense Minister Adm. Shamkhani scheduled to September 2001. It was he who should have negotiated contracts. A few days before the planned visit the chief executive of New Programs and Concepts defense holding company Boris Kuzyk said in an interview with the state-run ITAR-TASS news agency that Russia and Iran "should pass on an absolutely new level: From drop shipments of Russian weapons and military equipment to joint production, when expedient". Meanwhile Russian experts in advance responded to the West's reaction to Russia's involvement in Iran. A member of Russian Military Academy Vladimir Petrovsky said in an interview that the modernization of Iranian military would not change the power balance in the region. "Drastic transformation of the military forces would allow Tehran to improve security and acquire the weight of a strong regional nation. Only Western rivals of Russian manufacturers of arms losing benefit contracts might be dissatisfied," the scholar pointed out.

Everything was ready but Adm. Shamkhani suddenly canceled the visit. Later Iran's foreign ministry made it clear that defense minister decided against going to Moscow because the Russian government was receiving Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel.

The respectable liberal Novye Izvestia daily then wrote that "earnings from weapon deals with Iran might well recompense Russia for worsening relations with the U.S. administration and criticism of Israel".

That is the main principle of Russia's relations with Iran and other rogue states. At the same time Russian Foreign Ministry capitalize on ties with Iran being in a winner's position in any case. Its officials can talk of geopolitical alliance with Iran and China for the counterbalancing of the United States and creation of the "multi-polar world". At the same time Russia raises its global status making clear to the West that as the regime in Tehran is dependent on its diplomatic support and arms supplies it can influence on Iranian mullahs and resolve the present nuclear standoff. The West seems to believe with the top officials repeatedly saying that no tougher approach to Russia, including its expulsion from G-8 or at least the boycott of the G-8 summit in St. Petersburg, is possible because they need Russia as a partner capable to solve the problem of Iran.

So far, all we have seen suggest that Iran uses Russia to win time. It started negotiating Russia's offer to enrich its uranium on Russian soil, but Iranian negotiators not once abruptly ceased talks giving no reasons. But whatever, if any, will be the outcome of the negotiations it will never prevent Iran from parallel enrichment of uranium at its own facilities. The Iranian deadline may be fall of 2006 when it is going to deploy all air defense systems sold by Moscow. Russia meanwhile considers that deal to be very important as it could strengthen its positions at the arms markets of Africa and the Middle East. Moscow relies on defense sector contribution to diversification of export income from natural resources. So we can expect the contract to be fulfilled as scheduled.

Back in 2002, the leader of Russian nationalist Rodina (Motherland) party Dmitry Rogozin, then the head of the Foreign Affairs Commission in Russia's Parliament told this author: "Politics and economics are always interrelated. Everything benefit for Russia economically is benefit in general. If it is benefit to sell arms to Iran and build the nuclear power plant in Bushehr we should do it. At the same time we have no interest in letting our neighbors to have strategic offensive weapons. Everything happens, the political map is unstable, and any friendly regime might be replaced with an unfriendly one. And we have no interest in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction near our borders."

So far the regime of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who is going to "wipe Israel off the map" seems to be Russian-friendly. But Mr. Ahmadinejad is anything but predictable. What will Russia do if Iranian president suddenly remember of his Islamic brothers in Chechnya? Nobody has yet managed to get weapon "toys" provided to a friendly regime back from an unfriendly one. This week, on the eve of the Iranian New Year, Mr. Ahmadinejad said in a televised address: "Nuclear technology is not something we obtained easily, or something someone gave us so that they could take it back; no one can take it back." It is half-true as it was Russia, among others, who gave nuclear technology to Tehran. But who really cares?