Two state elections heads resign in Florida

can we really trust a centralized, federally controlled electronic voting system? i'm sorry, but i'll wait a couple weeks while hand counted paper ballots are counted. i don't have to know in 2 seconds which bought and paid for controlled fake left or fake right establishment 'candidate' 'wins' the s'election'...

"It doesn't matter who votes, what matters is who counts the votes."
--Joseph Stalin

Two state elections heads resign in Florida
Black Box Voting | November 05, 2005

The most high-profile resignation is Florida Secretary of State Glenda Hood, who announced Nov. 2 that she is resigning, effective Nov. 21. Hood says she is leaving to spend more time with her family.

The most important resignation is Florida State Elections Division Voting Systems head Paul Craft, who has been a kingpin on the national certifications committee, the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED) Voting Systems Panel. His resignation becomes effective Nov. 30.

Craft's resignation creates some real questions. He says he is leaving to start Paul Craft, Inc., his own consulting firm.

If Craft's consulting firm evaluates voting systems, it will represent an interesting use of talent -- in his capacity as voting systems advisor he missed or withheld information on security defects the size of Carnival cruise ships.

Missing in action -- Craft's comments on:

1) The Diebold optical scan design flaw allowing manipulation through removable, credit-card-sized "memory cards," which appears to violate the 1990 FEC standards to which he certified the system. This flaw has been characterized as "the mother of all security holes."
Hursti's report

2) The GEMS defect, which has now been acknowledged by Diebold, allows anyone with access to manipulate both ballot design and votes in the central tabulator. Black Box Voting has recently learned that this defect puts mail-in ballots at especially high risk.

This defect is considered so serious that Diebold has taken steps recently to locate third party software to reduce the risk. The GEMS defect is easy to spot, simple to confirm, and was exposed publicly on July 8, 2003.
More on the GEMS defect

Did Craft not know of these defects, or did he just choose not to say anything?

On Oct. 6 and 7, Craft met with Harri Hursti, the author of the memory card study. Hursti's study was also cited in the Oct. 21 GAO report.

But Craft knew how grave the memory card vulnerability was much earlier: On July 28, Craft received correspondence from M.I.T. security expert Ronald Rivest, characterizing the Hursti-identified defects as "stunning" and "startling." Rivest wrote that he had forwarded the report to the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), recommending replication. If the findings turn out to be true, Rivest indicated, the system should never have been certified, as it would indeed violate even 1990 FEC standards.

Paul Craft was, of course, one of the individuals who certified the system.
Rivest letter

Thirty of Florida's 66 counties use the Diebold optical scan system containing the memory card problem, along with the defective GEMS tabulator.

In Washington D.C., at the time of the National Institute of Standards & Technology NIST) "Threats to Voting Systems" conference, Craft indicated that the state of Florida would soon set up an independent testing entity for its voting machines.

The next question is:

Will the state of Florida contract with Paul Craft, Inc., to test its voting machines, and if so, how can that be justified?

These security and accuracy problems were exposed by others (see the Aug. 18, 2004 independent report by CompuWare). This report confirms the GEMS defect, but for some reason was withheld from the public by Ohio Secretary of State Ken Blackwell until 2005. Blackwell failed to implement its recommendations to mitigate the GEMS defect risks rated as "high, high, high" by CompuWare. Black Box Voting has submitted public records and Freedom of Information requests to find out whether Blackwell passed the information along to the EAC, as fiduciary duty would require.

We find no evidence that either Blackwell or Craft told any elections supervisors about the defects, nor have we seen any evidence that either distributed information on steps to mitigate these known risks.

Sinking ship, meet rats

Thus begins the most massive butt-covering operation in elections history, as the truth about computerized voting systems becomes undeniable.

Many eyes are now fixed on R. Doug Lewis, the enigmatic director of The Election Center.

"I feel like hanging myself," said Lewis at the Oct. 7 NIST "Threats to voting systems" conference. Lewis helped choose, and continues to run interference for, the Independent Testing Labs (ITAs), primarily Wyle Labs (Jim Dearman) and Ciber, Inc. (Shawn Southworth).

These ITAs are being paid by the vendors to evaluate their defective voting systems. Time after time, ordinary citizens uncover staggering defects, and machines choke during elections. Time after time, the ITAs issue clean bills of health.

What we are seeing now is an effort to let everyone bow out gracefully, without (yet) really acknowledging the gravity of what these bogus certifiers, complicit secretaries of state, timid congressional investigators, and corrupt vendors have wrought upon this country.

The overseers of elections for the most powerful nation in the world are lining up to receive their free passes. Perhaps now is a good time for someone to ask:

Is anyone going to be held accountable?

It's been a long time coming.

Black Box Voting | October 21, 2005

Today, the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report finding flaws in voting system security, access, and controls, with multiple examples of real election failures. Although national initiatives to improve security of electronic voting systems are underway, "it is unclear when these initiatives will be available," said the report.

Oct. 7, Black Box Voting was invited to attend a groundbreaking Washington D.C. event titled â??Threats to Voting Systems,â?� sponsored by the National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST). For the first time, election officials, scientists, and election reform advocates discussed the realities of voting machine risks in earnest, without rancor or defensiveness.

(http://www.vote.nist.gov/threats/index.html)

The outcome of the meeting was an agreement to catalogue risks, and develop mitigation strategies. Not all participants were entirely comfortable with the proceedings.

â??I feel like hanging myself,â?� said R. Doug Lewis

Lewis is the enigmatic director of The Election Center (a private entity which has derided critics of voting machine security). Lewis looked pale and uncomfortable, but he was in the minority.

The Brennan Center for Justice provided a powerful presence at the NIST event, sending scientists, lawyers, and accountants to the event. Travis County, Texas Elections Supervisor Dana DeBeauvoir expressed eagerness to obtain the attack catalogue, along with risk mitigations. Other participants in the NIST â??Threatsâ?� conference included Dr. Doug Jones, a riveting panelist who demonstrated expertise, historical perspective, and fascinating storytelling skills.

ES&S sent three representatives; Diebold sent Ian Piper; Hart Intercivic sent two attendees, but we didnâ??t see anyone from Sequoia.

Two county elections offices known for obstructive behavior and election security questions sent representatives (Riverside, California; and DuPage County, Illinois). Traditional touch-screen cheerleaders from the states of Georgia, Washington, Maryland and Florida showed up, along with a representative for the National Association of Secretaries of State.

People, Procedures & Policies = Perimeter Defense = Piss Poor Planning

People, policies and procedures provide a "perimeter defense" to election security. Like a fence outside the house, with a guard house and a security staff to admit guests, this can be very important. It doesn't mean you don't also lock the house, have a burglar alarm, put the jewels (which you insure) in a safe, and keep the bulk of your money in secure financial institutions somewhere off the property, diversified so if one investment weakens, it does not take down the others.

While it is true that the perimeter defense -- people and procedures -- are of critical importance to election integrity, it's silly to depend on this without also ensuring independent layers of security built into the voting system itself. Responsible people anticipate points of penetration and risk when protecting their fortunes. The same concept applies to elections.

Two groups seemed to feel compelled to quell the trend toward identifying penetration points and having multiple, independent layers of security. The ITAA, a lobbying group for the vendors, submitted a cautious admonition:

â??â?¦at this early stage, it is impossible for us to provide meaningful comments as a groupâ?¦In developing a framework for this project, we would respectfully request that NIST and the voting community look to the guidance of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, which recognized both process and infrastructure shortcomings in the American election system.â?�(more)

The Florida Association of Supervisors of Elections submitted a position paper, but apparently did not learn much from the presentations which emphasized that focusing on a single layer of defense is poor security. A layered approach, where if one layer fails, another will prevail, is better. Instead, the Florida officials urged the group to focus on a perimeter defense (people, policies and procedures).

â??We firmly believe that people, policies and procedures are critical to the efficient operation of these systems. The â??Three Pâ??s,â?� as we refer to them, are often overlooked as being an integral part of the system. Because of this oversight, these systems have taken a great deal of the blame for 'failure' ...â?�(more)

A considerable number of papers, analyzing possible points of penetration, were presented, and we have provided links to them below. The GAO report cites several of these reports. Both the NIST event and the GAO report cite Harri Hurstiâ??s â??Black Box Reportâ?� as an important part of their analysis.

It is time to stop leaning on secrecy, â??security by obscurity,â?� and fragile, easily corrupted â??perimeter defensesâ?�

As shown by recent indictments of two election workers in Cuyahoga County (a location that urges the perimeter defense as a solution election integrity problems), security problems are most likely to work their way out from the inside. Relying on inside â??people, policies and proceduresâ?� is not compatible with democracy.

Here is the full GAO Report

taking bets now if Democrats bitch when a republican once again wins Presidential elections? Bet they will point to the same county if Florida as being disenfranchised/voter fraud. Seems that idiots down in Miami-Dade County (minority county) cant vote correctly if its spelled out for them..wait..it is spelled out for them and they still cant get it right.