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I wonder how the federal/state energy assistance program takes it if they find that they are paying a federal and or state subsidy to some one who claims a budget income that is not correct, and at the same time using that federal and or state energy credit or subsidy to grow a plant that is illegal to grow under federal law?
Could that be construed as fraud or theft of services or some such thing? :confused::what:
Just as much as you collecting SSI... get it? No. You've been cock blocked by them.:D nice try... are you trying to dry snitch here?? lol. That one has already been tried.lol.:DQuote:
Originally Posted by gypski
What is illegal though, is praying on vulnerably disabled persons on that program trying to make out false claims as a defense to one's conduct for causing harm to the person and the program...;):thumbsup:
Especially, when they have been investigating it for sometime now. :D And know these type of persons you speak about have no other sources of income to defraud them with...just silly claims with questions like yours... next?
I apologize up front but this is my final word on this subject and I'm sorry some had to be aired out on this public forum. But................:(Quote:
Originally Posted by jamessr
I was going to lay off this and just go on with my life getting out of here, but it seems just after making his last comment on Friday night, JamesSr cut the phone line along with another lie. Qwest came and fixed it today, and took note of what is going on with the water being cut off along with this form of harassment. I believe it is a crime to tamper with phone company equipment especially in the commission of a crime. Harassment after I told you I'd be gone as soon as my direct deposit is made. You went too far and you will pay for it. Sorry but you don't own the phone lines or any outside connections, they belong to Qwest. And I will not tolerate your harassment so stay in your trailer until I leave or don't approach me or it will be construed as continued harassment. :thumbsup:
and I will video record and voice record the incident. :thumbsup:
I am also sorry this had to come here from you... A little legal point should be noted here... trespassers have no rights as your speaking of... instead, you are the one stealing from the subsidy program... the utilities are not yours to complain about or have any rights to use...Quote:
Originally Posted by gypski
As for qwest trespassing my property in your name... well, corporate already knows... I got 2 disconnect orders from them before I touched my phone line on my property...qwest owns everything upto my property line..i.e. the junction box in the street..
You asked qwest to enter into an illegal contract under false pretenses...
So grow-up, be a man, suck it up, and move on...stop harassing me thinking your going to get money here..:thumbsup:
9A.52.080. Criminal trespass in the second degree
(1) A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the second degree if he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises of another under circumstances not constituting criminal trespass in the first degree.
(2) Criminal trespass in the second degree is a misdemeanor.
HISTORY: 1979 ex.s. c 244 § 13; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.52.080.
NOTES: EFFECTIVE DATE -- 1979 EX.S. C 244: See RCW 9A.44.902.
IN GENERAL.
Washington places important emphasis on a person's right to exclude others from his or her private property, regardless of the size or developed state of that property. State v. Johnson, 75 Wn. App. 692, 879 P.2d 984 (1994), review denied, 126 Wn.2d 1004, 891 P.2d 38 (1995).
The matter of trespass to private property is primarily of state and local concern; state and local laws, not federal laws, govern trespass issues. State v. Johnson, 75 Wn. App. 692, 879 P.2d 984 (1994), review denied, 126 Wn.2d 1004, 891 P.2d 38 (1995).
;)
Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the police are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in a belief that an offense has been committed. Theft is to "wrongfully obtain or exert unauthorized control over the property or services of another or the value thereof, with intent to deprive him of such property or services[.]" 17 Here, Engebretson took electricity from the house next door after the landlord had unplugged her cord, and after she knew that the landlord's daughter- in-law had moved out. This constituted probable cause for theft, and the trial court did not err by so finding.:wtf:Quote:
Originally Posted by jamessr
See Evans v. Luster, 84 Wn. App. 447, 450, 928 P.2d 455 (1996), noting:
If a contract is illegal or flows from an illegal act, a court will leave the parties as it finds them. An agreement to violate a statute or municipal ordinance is void, except when the agreement is not criminal or immoral and the statute or ordinance contains an adequate remedy for its violation.
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that under the Fourth Amendment, tenants, not landlords, have a privacy interest in leased residences. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616-17, 81 S. Ct. 776, 5 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1961). In Chapman, a tenant successfully challenged a warrantless search carried out with the landlord's consent. The court held the landlord had no authority to consent to a search of property leased to and occupied by others; the tenant enjoyed the privacy right in the leased premises, and only the tenant could waive that right. In the realm of housing code inspections, the Court reached the same result: without the tenant's consent, a warrant was necessary to authorize an inspection of rented premises. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967). See also In re 728 Belmont Avenue, 24 N.C. App. 17, 210 S.E.2d 73, 77 (N.C. App. 1971) (Camara "gives rise to the clear implication that the Supreme Court considered the Fourth Amendment privilege personal to the occupant of the place to be searched.").
Although the issue whether a tenant may consent to a search of his or her leased apartment is one of first impression in Washington, we have previously approved the reasoning of both Chapman and Camara in the context of Const. art. 1, § 7. See State v. Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 537, 543, 688 P.2d 859 (1984); King County v. Primeau, 98 Wn.2d 321, 329, 654 P.2d 1199 (1982).
Other courts considering this issue have held that tenants may consent to searches of their leased premises. 4 Appellants cite no authority to the contrary. The reason a tenant may consent to a search of his or her leased premises has been explained as follows:
It is the right of possession rather than the right of ownership which ordinarily determines who may consent to a police search of a particular place. Thus, the landlord and tenant cannot be said to have "common authority" over rented premises, as that phrase is used in United States v. Matlock [415 U.S. 164, 171, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242, 94 S. Ct. 988 (1974)]; the tenant's right is superior, and thus the landlord cannot give consent which will be effective against the tenant. It logically follows, as the cases have held when the issue has presented itself, that the tenant may consent to a search of the leased premises during the term of the lease and that evidence found in a search based upon this consent is admissible against the landlord.
(Footnotes omitted.) 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.5, at 298-99 (2d ed. 1987). Because the tenant, not the landlord, has the privacy interest in the leased premises, we join the jurisdictions which hold that tenants possess the authority to consent to a search of their individual apartment units, notwithstanding any objections by their landlords.
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4 See, e.g., In re 728 Belmont Avenue, 24 N.C. App. 17, 210 S.E.2d 73, 77 (N.C. App. 1974) (consent of a tenant in actual possession and control of the premises is sufficient to authorize a search by a city housing inspector to determine compliance with the housing code); State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 781 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (the fact that appellant is co-owner of the property does not, of itself, establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises); People v. Koris, 107 Ill. App. 3d 821, 438 N.E.2d 593, 596, 63 Ill. Dec. 662 (Ill. App. 1982) (lessee, not owner, has the expectation of privacy in the leased premises, even if the owner retains the right to enter the area to make repairs); State v. Reagan, 35 N.C. App. 140, 240 S.E.2d 805, 807-08 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978) (warrantless search of a barn owned by the defendant was valid because the tenant in possession of the barn consented). See also United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 212, (9th Cir. 1978) (a party who has a key to the premises and access throughout the residence can validly consent to a search) (citing United States v. Green, 523 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. Cal. 1975)).:D
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